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## 1

#### Financial incentives must be targeted at energy generation

O’Brien, Minister of State, Department for Energy and Climate Change, UK Parliament, 11/18/’8

(Mike, “Clause 20 — Terms and conditions,” <http://www.theyworkforyou.com/debate/?id=2008-11-18b.159.3>)

I have quite a lot still to say, so I shall try to give as full a reply, and as brief, as possible. Amendment (b) to Lords amendment No. 42 suggests we replace the term "financial incentives" in proposed new subsection (2)(a) with "payment". The use of the term "financial incentives" clarifies that the general purpose of the scheme is to incentivise low-carbon electricity generation through financial incentives, as opposed to other means such as a regulatory obligation or barrier-busting support, such as help with the planning system. We believe that such clarity is helpful in setting out beyond any doubt the primary purpose of the scheme. However, to give additional reassurances about our intentions, I would point to the powers under proposed new subsection (3) that specifies the term "payment" in all the key provisions that will establish the scheme. In others words, it is explicit that we are dealing with payments to small-scale generators. What is proposed will be a real feed-in tariff scheme.

#### R&D isn’t tied to energy production—plan is an indirect incentive

EIA, Energy Information Administration, Office of Energy Markets and End Use, U.S. DOE, ‘92

(“Federal Energy Subsidies: Direct and Indirect Interventions in Energy Markets,” ftp://tonto.eia.doe.gov/service/emeu9202.pdf)

Research and development. The budgetary cost of Government-funded research and development (R&D) is easy to measure. Determining the extent to which Government energy R&D is a subsidy is more problematic: often it takes the form of a direct payment to producers or consumers, but the payment is not tied to the production or consumption of energy in the present. If successful, Federal-applied R&D will affect future energy prices and costs, and so could be considered an indirect subsidy.

#### Vote Neg—tons of bidirectional mechanisms impact energy tech in ways that could increase production—only direct financial disbursements for increased production create a predictable and manageable topic

EIA, Energy Information Administration, Office of Energy Markets and End Use, U.S. DOE, ‘92

(“Federal Energy Subsidies: Direct and Indirect Interventions in Energy Markets,” ftp://tonto.eia.doe.gov/service/emeu9202.pdf)

In some sense, most Federal policies have the potential to affect energy markets. Policies supporting economic stability or economic growth have energy market consequences; so also do Government policies supporting highway development or affordable housing. The interaction between any of these policies and energy market outcomes may be worthy of study. However, energy impacts of such policies would be incidental to their primary purpose and are not examined here. Instead, this report focuses on Government actions whose prima facie purpose is to affect energy market outcomes, whether through financial incentives, regulation, public enterprise, or research and development.

## 2

#### Nuclear production locks in productionism through obsession with finance, competitiveness and technological solutions

**Maciejewska and Marszalek ’11** (Malgorzata, institute of Sociology and Faculty of Social Sciences at Wroclaw University, and Marcin, Wroclaw University (Poland), “Lack of power or lack of democracy: the case of the projected nuclear power plant in Poland,” Economic and Environmental Studies Vol. 11, No.3 (19/2011), 235-248, Sept. 2011, AM)

The mainstream discourse on nuclear power rarely takes up the question of how the global energy industry is organized. In the modern economy the production of energy around the world, which is supposed to be a kind of public good and to guarantee sustainable development, is planned and arranged under free market conditions. As a part of the global chain of extraction, production and trading, it is subordinated to the neoliberal logic on terms of which the society and economy is governed as a business enterprise with the logic of maximum interest and minimum loss. This imposes on different actors (from the international corporations to individual households) the discipline of competitiveness and profitability, resulting in the growth of existing inequalities as ‘the invisible hand’ of the free market economy legitimizes those subjects which are already in power. The modern global economy is based on irrational production and social inequalities where one can observe the processes of work intensification and the cheapening of labor. The markets are dominated by the unproductive virtual economy (See Peterson, 2002) where the major players are the financial institutions which, by means of sophisticated financial tools, buy and sell virtual products (currencies, stocks, insurances, debts and its derivatives). In effect, the major actors in the capitalist economy are the international investors who have the capability of financial liquidity, and operate with those sophisticated financial tools on the global stock market. Even when they lose those capacities because of indebtedness, the states and international organizations seem often to be willing to repair the damage by transferring the taxes paid by citizens. (This is actually happening now, during the financial crisis, when southern and western European countries are subjected to shock therapy under which governments introduce austerity measures.) The praxis of nuclear power producers and the discourse which legitimizes it is therefore reduced to one goal – increasing financial revenues. The Polish plan to build the atomic power plant seems to be another element of the competitiveness strategy. In the authorities’ mind set it could put Poland into the position of more a competitive, more dynamic economy, as expected by the European Union and international organizations such as the International Monetary Fund or the World Bank. The welfare of Poland’s or Niger’s society does not fit into that picture. The nuclear establishment does not take into account the most important aspect of sustainable development: the overall reduction of energy consumption and therefore of energy production. Such a policy could bring a wide range of profits to the societies, the ecosystem, as well as the economy. On the contrary, the increase of power production and power use is one of the core concepts of pro-atomic discourse. This dogmatic belief draws the ideological line indicated at the beginning: the question of energy use and the ideas for solving this problem are seen only as a matter of technological challenges and the amount of financial and material means which have to be invested in them, but not as an effort to re-organize and restructure the modern economy.

#### The IDEOLOGICAL commitment to energy producivism key to consumption -causes tech positivism, ecoinjustice and neoliberal expansionism - EXTINCTION

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[http://bst.sagepub.com/content/29/2/81.full.pdf+html](http://bst.sagepub.com/content/29/2/81.full.pdf%2Bhtml)

“Living Well”: Growth Without End Since the industrial revolution, social progress has been measured by material affluence. In turn, assuring wealth and its increase has been the responsibility of a set of institutions capable of planning for and (hopefully) delivering a boundless frontier of expanding production and consumption. Indeed, living well in modern times means an existence assured of a free and constantly rising flow of goods and services delivered conveniently and, ideally, at low cost.3 Perpetual acts of buying and selling adorn daily life as moderns dedicate time and imagination to shopping at levels unknown in human history. This commitment to the search for and absorption of more represents a “cornucopian” predisposition embedded in the micro- to macro-scales of modern life—from the personality of the modern individual to the culture and political economy of modern society (Byrne & Yun, 1999). Making this feature of modern life work in real time is no easy task. It requires unending engineered change in products and production and in parallel, continual change in consumption preferences designed by advertising. Production and marketing techniques shape and serve, on a grand scale, an ethos of unconstrained producing, shopping, and buying. Planned obsolescence is a necessary practice, applied to all goods, from toys to automobiles to computers to buildings, and even to social relationships and personalities;4 all have designed shelf lives when they are to be discarded for new and improved versions. In this manner, market demand grows synergistically with the modern hum of progress. More than 50 years ago, a market analyst could readily describe the economic and technological logic underpinning modern success (Lebow, 1955). Our enormously productive economy demands that we make consumption a way of life, that we convert the buying and use of goods into rituals, that we seek our spiritual satisfaction, our ego satisfaction, in consumption. We need things consumed, burned up, replaced, and discarded at an ever-increasing rate. (p. 5) The lubricant for successful obsolescence is a finance system able to supply (and profit from) a wide range of credit facilities from installment buying to capitalized production. These facilities ensure that buying can keep up with producing, even if there is not enough money ready at hand.5 Growth without end is, in this way, institutionalized as a permanent goal of modern society. By the last quarter of the 20th century, the complex system of ceaseless growth had proved to be so successful that moderns could reason that the reality manufactured by human institutions is palpably superior to the one embodied in natural existence. From the thermostatically controlled air-conditioned, centrally heated and equably humidified colonial farmhouses in the city, we may bowl along limited access highways in our private air-conditioned maximum visibility bubbles at 60 miles per hour, accompanied by a full orchestra, and arrive in the parking decks of our multi-deck air conditioned, pedestrian/traffic segregated urban centers, for work, education, shopping or culture, without ever venturing into the open air! (Lewis, 1969, p. 311) A life involving less and less interaction with the natural world has quickly become a hallmark of living well as nearly 90% of the 24-hour day is now spent indoors (Fisk, 2000). Norms of “efficiency, rationality, optimizing and ‘time-saving’ behavior” justify the organization of human life beyond the confines of suboptimal nature (O’Hara & Stagl, 2001, p. 540). Separation from the natural world is facilitated and reinforced by technological advancements which collapse the boundaries of space and time enabling social transactions without natural limitation. In fact, the middle and upper classes of wealthy societies have little or no need to venture outside. The resulting social alienation from nature leaves mostly the poor to witness the environmental consequences of endless growth. Only their livelihoods are immediately and significantly threatened by the “normal pollution” of modernity (see Byrne, Glover, & Martinez, 2002). Until pictures, video, and text on environmental harm are found online, the middle class cannot experience it. And this is (partly) why middle class environmentalism seeks redress in technological positivism. The everyday of indoor life is protected and nourished by technology; so why shouldn’t this work for the outdoors as well? Energy Obesity The commodification of human life and nature are the foundations of the modern thrust. Together, these forces changed the direction of human and natural history, creating the distinct era in which life, in all forms, now transpires. But the modern era needed and continues to need a special ingredient—energy. This was recently confirmed by the chairman of the U.S. Federal Reserve Board (Bernanke, 2006). At the most basic level, oil and natural gas are just primary commodities, like tin, rubber, or iron ore. Yet energy commodities are special, in part because they are critical inputs to a very wide variety of production processes of modern economies. They provide the fuel that drives our transportation system, heats our homes and offices, and powers our factories. For modern life, energy is the one commodity always needed to make and use anything. In this respect, energy supply is what enables the pursuit of boundless growth; because of modern energy, we can aspire to produce and possess everything. The modern energy system epitomizes its age. Lovins and others roundly criticized its evolution on the ground that its scale and volume are poorly matched to the often much smaller scales and volumes of energy use. But the criticism misses a key point: the mismatch is, in fact, by design; it is essential for modern society to reproduce itself. After all, the potential for incessant growth can only be exploited if an ever-present capacity to fuel such growth exists. Having just enough energy presumes the nonsensical idea of just enough growth; there is never enough growth in the modern era. Lewis Mumford’s thoughtful, in-depth analysis (1934, 1961, and 1970) explains why energy is special in our time. Modern energy systems only come in extra large sizes because “quantitative production has become, for our mass-minded contemporaries, the only imperative goal: they value quantification without qualification” (Mumford, 1961, p. 57). Volume and scale of output are the standard bearers of serious energy options because these are the shared metrics of the alliance of science, capitalism, and carbon power. All three run on the principle that more is better; more knowledge, more power, and more commodities are signs of progress. As a Mumford contemporary has observed, excessive accumulation of energy sustains the modern “social metabolism” (Martinez-Alier, 2006): Energy is not a “sector” of the economy. On the contrary, the market economy as a whole is only one part of the human ecology that must be characterized in terms of the human influence on the flows of energy and materials and interference in the biogeochemical cycles (for instance, in the carbon cycle, with the enhanced greenhouse effect). (p. 37, 55) The wealth-energy association and its concomitant environmental needs has produced a feedback loop: the physical processes that produce material wealth are reliant on energy regimes which foster continued growth of output; increased growth in resource use and consumptive demand (through planned obsolescence and advertising) create and reinforce social norms and obligations to increase consumption; increased demand encourages expansion of the physical processes that produce material wealth; and so on. Perpetuation of this self-sealing logic is a defining characteristic of the modern energy regime, with little distinction between public and private operations. For example, critiques of the centralized energy monopolies and oligopolies from “big oil” to “giant” electric utilities (Pinchot & Ettinger, 1925; Yergin, 1991) were answered by public replicas of the large, complex, and hierarchically managed energy systems: the Tennessee Valley Authority, the Bonneville Power Administration, and the Rural Electrification Administration. These public programs reinforce, rather than oppose, the structures of energy obesity. Much like biophysical obesity, energy obesity is driven by the need to expand without regard to quality of life. Its motive is the commodification of human life and the environment so that growth without end can be served. Thus, living well rests, in the modern case, on the antihealth ideal of energy obesity, and climate change represents, in scale, its most extensive threat to life in all forms.5

#### Energy debates should focus on CRITIQUE of broad structures INSTEAD of producitivist fixes. Our ROLE OF THE BALLOT is best EVEN IF they win some truth claims – we must SHIFT THE FRAME

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Green illusions,

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Since this book represents a critique of alternative energy, it may seem an unlikely manual for alternative-energy proponents. But it is. Building alternative-energy infrastructure atop America's present economic, social, and cultural landscape is akin to building a sandcastle in a rising tide. A taller sand castle won't help. The first steps in this book sketch a partial blueprint for making alternative-energy technologies relevant into the future. Technological development alone will do little to bring about a durable alternative-energy future. Reimagining the social conditions of energy use will. Ultimately, we have to ask ourselves if environmentalists should be involved in the business of energy production (of any sort) while so many more important issues remain vastly underserved. Over the next several decades, it's quite likely that our power production cocktail will look very much like the mix of today, save for a few adjustments in market share. Wind and biofuel generation will become more prevalent and the stage is set for nuclear power as well, despite recent catastrophes. Nevertheless, these changes will occur over time—they will seem slow. Every power production mechanism has side effects and limitations of its own, and a global shift to new forms of power production simply means that humanity will have to deal with new side effects and limitations in the future. This simple observation seems to have gotten lost in the cheerleading for alternative-energy technologies. The mainstream environmental movement should throw down the green energy pom-poms and pull out the bifocals. It is entirely reasonable for environmentalists to criticize fossil-fuel industries for the harms they instigate. It is, however, entirely unreasonable for environmentalists to become spokespeople for the next round of ecological disaster machines such as solar cells, ethanol, and battery-powered vehicles. Environmentalists pack the largest punch when they instead act as power production watchdogs (regardless of the production method); past environmentalist pressures have cleaned the air and made previously polluted waterways swimmable. This watchdog role will be vital in the future as biofuels, nuclear plants, alternative fossil fuels, solar cells, and other energy technologies import new harms and risks. Beyond a watchdog role, environmentalists yield the greatest progress when addressing our social fundamentals, whether by supporting human rights, cleaning up elections, imagining new economic structures, strengthening communities, revitalizing democracy, or imagining more prosperous modes of consumption. Unsustainable energy use is a symptom of suboptimal social conditions. Energy use will come down when we improve these conditions: consumption patterns that lead to debt and depression; commercials aimed at children; lonely seniors stuck in their homes because they can no longer drive; kids left to fend for themselves when it comes to mobility or sexuality; corporate influence trumping citizen representation; measurements of the nation's health in dollars rather than well-being; a media concerned with advertising over insight, and so on. These may not seem like environmental issues, and they certainly don't seem like energy policy issues, but in reality they are the most important energy and environmental issues of our day. Addressing them won't require sacrifice or social engineering. They are congruent with the interests of many Americans, which will make them easier to initiate and fulfill. They are entirely realistic (as many are already enjoyed by other societies on the planet). They are, in a sense, boring. In fact, the only thing shocking about them is the degree to which they have been underappreciated in contemporary environmental thought, sidelined in the media, and ignored by politicians. Even though these first steps don't represent a grand solution, they are necessary preconditions if we intend to democratically design and implement more comprehensive solutions in the future. Ultimately, clean energy is less energy. Alternative-energy alchemy has so greatly consumed the public imagination over recent decades that the most vital and durable environmental essentials remain overlooked and underfunded. Today energy executives hiss silver-tongued fairy tales about clean-coal technologies, safe nuclear reactors, and renewable sources such as solar, wind, and biofuels to quench growing energy demands, fostering the illusion that we can maintain our expanding patterns of energy consumption without consequence. At the same time, they claim that these technologies can be made environmentally, socially, and politically sound while ignoring a history that has repeatedly shown otherwise. If we give in to accepting their conceptual frames, such as those pitting production versus production, or if we parrot their terms such as clean coal, bridge fuels, peacetime atom, smart growth, and clean energy, then we have already lost. We forfeit our right to critical democratic engagement and instead allow the powers that be to regurgitate their own terms of debate into our open upstretched mouths. Alternative-energy technologies don't clean the air. They don't clean the water. They don't protect wildlife. They don't support human rights. They don't improve neighborhoods. They don't strengthen democracy. They don't regulate themselves. They don't lower atmospheric carbon dioxide. They don't reduce consumption. They produce power. That power can lead to durable benefits, but only given the appropriate context. Ultimately, it's not a question of whether American society possesses the technological prowess to construct an alternative-energy nation. The real question is the reverse. Do we have a society capable of being powered by alternative energy? The answer today is clearly no. But we can change that. Future environmentalists will drop solar, wind, biofuels, nuclear, hydrogen, and hybrids to focus instead on women's rights, consumer culture, walkable neighborhoods, military spending, zoning, health care, wealth disparities, citizen governance, economic reform, and democratic institutions. As environmentalists and global citizens, it's not enough to say that we would benefit by shifting our focus. Our very relevance depends on it.

#### reject the aff’s embrace of UNSUSTAINABLE neoliberal ideology to REPOLITICIZE the energy debate – frames of ideological justification must PRECEDE the ENGINEEERING debate over energy

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<http://seedconsortium.pbworks.com/w/file/fetch/45925604/Byrne_etal.pdf>

Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Established in 1980 at the University of Delaware, the Center is a leading institution for interdisciplinary graduate education, research, and advocacy in energy and environmental policy. CEEP is led by Dr. John Byrne, Distinguished Professor of Energy & Climate Policy at the University. For his contributions to Working Group III of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) since 1992, he shares the 2007 Nobel Peace Prize with the Panel's authors and review editors.

Differences in ecological commitments between conventional and sustainable energy strategies still demarcate a battleground that, we agree, is important—even fundamental. But so also are the common aspirations of the two camps. Each sublimates social considerations in favor of a politics of more-is-better, and each regards the advance of energy capitalism with a sense of inevitability and triumph. Conventional and sustainable energy visions equally presume that a social order governed by a ‘democratic’ ideal of cornucopia, marked by economic plenty, and delivered by technological marvels will eventually lance the wounds of poverty and inequality and start the healing process. Consequently, silence on questions of governance and social justice is studiously observed by both proposals. Likewise, both agree to, or demur on, the question of capitalism’s sustainability.22 Nothing is said on these questions because, apparently, nothing needs to be. If the above assessment of the contemporary energy discourse is correct, then the enterprise is not at a crossroad; rather, it has reached a point of acquiescence to things as they are. Building an inquiry into energy as a social project will require the recovery of a critical voice that can interrogate, rather than concede, the discourse’s current moorings in technological politics and capitalist political economy. A fertile direction in this regard is to investigate an energy-society order in which energy systems evolve in response to social values and goals, and not simply according to the dictates of technique, prices, or capital. Initial interest in renewable energy by the sustainability camp no doubt emanated, at least in part, from the fact that its fuel price is non-existent and that capitalization of systems to collect renewable sources need not involve the extravagant, convoluted corporate forms that manage the conventional energy regime. But forgotten, or misunderstood, in the attraction of renewable energy have been the social origins of such emergent possibilities. Communities exist today who address energy needs outside the global marketplace: they are often rural in character and organize energy services that are immune to oil price spikes and do not require water heated to between 550º and 900º Fahrenheit (300º and 500º Celsius) (the typical temperatures in nuclear reactors). No energy bills are sent or paid and governance of the serving infrastructure is based on local (rather than distantly developed professional) knowledge. Needless to say, sustainability is embodied in the lifeworld of these communities, unlike the modern strategy that hopes to design sustainability into its technology and economics so as not to seriously change its otherwise unsustainable way of life. Predictably, modern society will underscore its wealth and technical acumen as evidence of its superiority over alternatives. But smugness cannot overcome the fact that energy-society relations are evident in which the bribe of democratic-authoritarianism and the unsustainability of energy capitalism are successfully declined. In 1928, Mahatma Gandhi (cited in Gandhi, 1965: 52) explained why the democratic-authoritarian bargain and Western capitalism should be rejected: God forbid that India should ever take to industrialization after the manner of the West. The economic imperialism of a single tiny island kingdom (England) is today keeping the world in chains. If an entire nation of 300 million took to similar economic exploitation, it would strip the world bare like locusts. Unless the capitalists of India help to avert that tragedy by becoming trustees of the welfare of the masses and by devoting their talents not to amassing wealth for themselves but to the service of the masses in an altruistic spirit, they will end either by destroying the masses or being destroyed by them. As Gandhi’s remark reveals, social inequality resides not in access to electric light and other accoutrements of modernity, but in a world order that places efficiency and wealth above life-affirming ways of life. This is our social problem, our energy problem, our ecological problem, and, generally, our political-economic problem. The challenge of a social inquiry into energy-society relations awaits.

## 3

#### Natural gas exports are unlikely as prices bounce back

Dlouhy, staff writer for the Houston Chronicle, 7/14/2012

(Jennifer, “Exporting natural gas a dilemma for U.S.,” <http://www.sfgate.com/business/article/Exporting-natural-gas-a-dilemma-for-U-S-3707334.php#ixzz23dQTdrev>)

The drilling boom that has led to a glut of natural gas and sent prices to 10-year lows is causing a quandary for the Obama administration, which is struggling to decide whether the United States should share the bounty with foreign countries.

Although the Energy Department recently approved Houston firm Cheniere Energy's plans to begin exporting liquefied natural gas from its terminal in southwest Louisiana, **the government has put off making decisions on similar applications from at least seven other companies**.

Administration officials say they'll make those decisions after they get the results of a study commissioned by the Energy Department on how allowing companies to sell U.S.-produced natural gas overseas would affect prices for American consumers. The study is due out this summer.

"We want analysis to drive decisions," White House energy adviser Heather Zichal said at a recent forum. The administration supports domestic natural gas and isn't opposed to exports, she said, but also is committed to "protecting American consumers and making sure we're sending the right signal to industry and the manufacturing sector."

The dilemma is politically treacherous in an election year and amidst a struggling economy. Although the United States already exports some natural gas - mostly by pipelines to Mexico and Canada - the flurry of proposals to liquefy natural gas for tanker shipment and sell it to foreign consumers would mean a big jump in exports.

**Plans may not fly**

Applications filed with the Energy Department could put the United States on track to export about 16 billion cubic feet of liquefied natural gas each day - almost a quarter of U.S. daily production in 2011.

**But few expect all of those proposals to win federal approval**, and it could be years before construction is finished on even those projects that win the green light. Experts say the realistic potential market for exports from the United States and Canada is 4 billion to 5 billion cubic feet per day by 2020.

An Energy Information Administration report released in January concluded that exporting natural gas would cause prices to climb in the United States. According to the agency, consumers' electricity bills would increase by 1 to 3 percent from 2015 to 2035 and industrial prices would climb 9 to 28 percent.

Unlike crude, which is a globally traded commodity, natural gas is traded on nonintegrated markets, resulting in huge price variations in different places. The prospect of selling natural gas in Asian and European markets at five times its price in the United States is enough to make most domestic producers giddy.

Energy companies and analysts have argued that current U.S. natural gas prices are unsustainable. It closed Friday at $2.874 per million BTUs in trading on the New York Mercantile Exchange.

The opposing argument is that exports could cause prices to spike, sending electricity bills upward and jeopardizing a resurgence in domestic manufacturing tied to abundant, cheap natural gas. Manufacturers that use natural gas to fuel their plants and as a building block to make other products were hit hard over the past two decades by volatile swings in prices, which last peaked over $15 in 2005.

Elected officials mum

Because any position risks alienating important constituencies - energy producers and manufacturers as well as rank-and-file voters - **few elected officials are pushing the issue**.

"It's a lot safer for politicians who don't want to be on the wrong side to defer it," said Kevin Book, an analyst with ClearView Energy Partners.

Even key stakeholders in the debate are keeping low profiles. Several major energy industry groups have kept mostly quiet, possibly for fear of advocating an export strategy linked to higher prices.

Many manufacturers, meanwhile, are wary of visibly opposing energy exports and being painted as free trade foes. Some companies also are torn because their foreign operations could benefit from an influx of cheaper U.S. natural gas.

President Obama and Republican challenger Mitt Romney also have avoided making big pronouncements.

Advances in drilling technology have allowed energy companies to extract natural gas from dense rock formations coast to coast and tap what analysts widely describe as a 100-year supply of the fossil fuel.

Time-out proposed

A few congressional critics are pushing for a time-out. Rep. Ed Markey, D-Mass., has introduced legislation that would halt new natural gas exports until 2025. Markey argues that the domestic natural gas explosion gives the United States a major global advantage that would be squandered by exports.

"This is our biggest game-changing moment in a generation," he said. "Low-priced natural gas is driving an American manufacturing renaissance."

Linking U.S. natural gas production with global markets would hamper moves to power more cars and produce more electricity with the gas, Markey said.

**Many analysts contend natural gas prices are destined to rise even without more exports** as companies scale back production.

#### Nuclear power trades off with electricity from natural gas

Malewitz, staff writer for Stateline, 3/7/2012

(Jim, “A year after Japan earthquake, U.S. nuclear plans stalled,” Lexis)

"There must be a shortage of natural gas and stable high prices to make the economics right," John Rowe, the chairman of Exelon, the nation's largest producer of nuclear power, said in a speech last August. "Shale is good for the country, bad for new nuclear development." In the past year, the price of natural gas has dropped by about 40 percent, reaching a 10-year low. That has prompted several companies to **shift investment to natural gas and away from nuclear energy**.

The shift could play out in Iowa, where William Fehrman, president of MidAmerican Energy, which hopes to build a second nuclear facility in the state, told the Des Moines Register last month that the company **might build a natural gas plant if the legislature doesn't pass incentives for nuclear construction**. Company representatives did not respond to Stateline's phone calls and emails asking for more details.

#### Exports offset natural gas from Russia

Ratner, specialist in Energy Policy at Congressional Research Service, et al, 2012

(Michael Ratner –, Paul Belkin – Specialist in European Affairs, Jim Nichol – Specialist in Russian and Eurasian Affairs, Steven Woehrel – Specialist in European Affairs, March 13, 2012, Europe’s Energy Security: Options and Challenges to Natural Gas Supply Diversification, Congressional Research Service, p. 25)

Possible U.S. LNG Exports: Pricing Not Volumes May Be Key

Proposed U.S. LNG export projects, if all were constructed today, would make the United States the second largest LNG exporter behind Qatar. The proposed projects are at various stages in the regulatory approval process. Nevertheless, analysts have already begun speculating on what a significant increase in U.S. LNG exports would mean to natural gas markets, especially to European markets. Any volumes of LNG from the United States would benefit the market, including Europe, by offering a new supplier to consumers. For parts of Europe, especially the Baltic region and Central Europe, where the United States enjoys strong and friendly relations, any decision to export U.S. LNG to that region would be welcomed as a potential offset to their dependence on Russian gas.

However, the bigger effect of U.S. entry into global LNG sales may be on pricing rather than supplies. The United States is one of the few countries that does not link its natural gas price to the price of oil and therefore may add to the pressure to delink the two commodities. Most natural gas sold in the world, by pipeline or as LNG, is sold under long-term contracts and indexed to the price of oil. Historically, the two commodities competed more directly in markets than they do today.

#### That destroys the Russian economy

Solomon, executive director of the non-governmental policy organization Energy Probe, 9/8/2012

(Lawrence, “Israel and Russia join forces over gas,” National Post, Canada, Lexis)

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Russia's economy descended into a decade of privation and chaos that Russians still recall with national shame. **Now Russia is back**, thanks to its emergence as an energy superpower. **Russia boasts Europe's fastest-growing economy** and its most potent military, both **due to its stranglehold over Europe's energy needs**. Loathe to lose either influence or sales in Europe, Russia keeps competitors at bay, as it did last year when it stymied a Turkish bid to build a competing natural gas pipeline to Europe.

#### Nuclear war

Filger, author and blogger for the Huffington Post, 2009

(Sheldon, “Russian Economy Faces Disastrous Free Fall Contraction” <http://www.globaleconomiccrisis.com/blog/archives/356>)

**In Russia** historically, **economic health and political stability are intertwined to a degree that is rarely encountered in other major** industrialized **economies**. It was the economic stagnation of the former Soviet Union that led to its political downfall. Similarly, **Medvedev and Putin**, both intimately acquainted with their nation’s history, **are unquestionably alarmed at the prospect that Russia’s economic crisis will endanger the nation’s political stability**, achieved at great cost after years of chaos following the demise of the Soviet Union. Already, strikes and protests are occurring among rank and file workers facing unemployment or non-payment of their salaries. Recent polling demonstrates that the once supreme popularity ratings of Putin and Medvedev are eroding rapidly. Beyond the political elites are the financial oligarchs, who have been forced to deleverage, even unloading their yachts and executive jets in a desperate attempt to raise cash. **Should the Russian economy deteriorate** to the point where economic collapse is not out of the question, **the impact will go far beyond the obvious accelerant such an outcome would be for the Global Economic Crisis**. There is a geopolitical dimension that is even more relevant then the economic context. Despite its economic vulnerabilities and perceived decline from superpower status, **Russia remains one of only two nations on earth with a nuclear arsenal of sufficient scope and capability to destroy the world** as we know it. For that reason, it is not only President Medvedev and Prime Minister Putin who will be lying awake at nights over the prospect that **a national economic crisis can transform itself into a virulent and destabilizing social and political upheaval**. It just may be possible that U.S. President Barack Obama’s national security team has already briefed him about the consequences of a major economic meltdown in Russia for the peace of the world. After all, the most recent national intelligence estimates put out by the U.S. intelligence community have already concluded that the Global Economic Crisis represents the greatest national security threat to the United States, due to its facilitating political instability in the world. **During the years** Boris **Yeltsin ruled Russia, security forces** responsible for **guarding the nation’s nuclear arsenal went without pay** for months at a time, **leading to fears that desperate personnel would** illicitly **sell nuclear weapons to terrorist organizations. If the current economic crisis in Russia were to deteriorate much further, how secure would the Russian nuclear arsenal remain?** It may be that the financial impact of the Global Economic Crisis is its least dangerous consequence.

## 4

#### The Fifty United States should substantially increase funding for the High Temperature Gas-Cooled Reactor energy production in the United States.

States historically incentivize nuclear industry

MarketWatch, 7

(“States Maneuver to Lure New Nuclear Power Plants,” 5/21, http://energyjustice.net/pipermail/nukenet\_energyjustice.net/2007-May/002037.html)

In a positive shift for U.S. power companies planning a new fleet of nuclear facilities, nuclear power has gained popularity in several states as a solution to high power prices and growing demand. Louisiana, Florida, South Carolina and Georgia are offering incentives to develop new nuclear generation, hoping that nuclear power prices will be lower and less volatile than power generated by natural gas. State regulators also hope new nuclear power plants will create jobs and bolster local industry. Nuclear operators say state rules ensuring cost recovery of new plants - particularly pre-construction costs - will likely affect their decisions about where to build new plants. Louisiana and Florida have approved measures that would allow New Orleans-based Entergy Corp. to pass on some pre-construction nuclear plant development costs to their customers, while Georgia regulators are considering a similar move.

## 5

#### Obama has the influence to prevail in fiscal cliff negotiations now---political capital is key

Sprung, 9/21

(Andrew Sprung is a political commentator & media consultant. He is the CEO of Sprung PR and hold a PhD from the University of Rochestor, “Ezra Klein's unconvincing theory that Obama misunderstands (or misrepresents) "change," http://xpostfactoid.blogspot.com/2012/09/ezra-kleins-unconvincing-theory-that.html)

In my view, Klein is viewing this question too narrowly. Obama is well aware of the limitations of the bully pulpit, and he's got to know better than any person on the planet that presidential advocacy polarizes, entrenching the opposing party in implacable opposition to whatever the president proposes. Yet, in presenting a revamped theory of how the presidency works, he's not just feeding us a line of BS. And if Obama wins reelection, I believe that we will look back five or ten or twenty years from now and recognize that yes, Obama did change the way Washington works. Or at the very least, he kept the US on a sane policy course in a time of extreme polarization and thus gave (will have given...) the system space to self-correct, as it has in the past. Let's start with Klein's objection to Obama's characterization of how healthcare reform got done: The health-care process, which I reported on extensively, was a firmly “inside game” strategy. There were backroom deals with most every major interest group and every swing legislator.... By the time the law passed, many more Americans viewed it unfavorably than viewed it favorably — exactly the opposite of what you’d expect if health care had passed through an “outside game” strategy in which, as Obama put it, “the American people … put pressure on Congress to move these things forward.” And yet, health care passed. The inside game worked. All true, laddie. And yet, in claiming that the impetus for healthcare reform came from the outside, I don't think Obama is attempting to whitewash this long and messy process -- or is even referring to it. He is alluding to the marshaling or channeling of popular will that got him elected. The essence of Obama's primary election argument against Hillary Clinton was that he was better equipped to marshal the popular will for fundamental change -- with healthcare reform as the centerpiece -- than she was. I well remember the moment when that argument first impressed itself on me. It was in a debate in the immediate aftermath of the Iowa caucuses, on Jan. 5, 2008: Look, I think it's easier to be cynical and just say, "You know what, it can't be done because Washington's designed to resist change." But in fact there have been periods of time in our history where a president inspired the American people to do better, and I think we're in one of those moments right now. I think the American people are hungry for something different and can be mobilized around big changes -- not incremental changes, not small changes. I actually give Bill Clinton enormous credit for having balanced those budgets during those years. It did take political courage for him to do that. But we never built the majority and coalesced the American people around being able to get the other stuff done. And, you know, so the truth is actually words do inspire. Words do help people get involved. Words do help members of Congress get into power so that they can be part of a coalition to deliver health care reform, to deliver a bold energy policy. Don't discount that power, because when the American people are determined that something is going to happen, then it happens. And if they are disaffected and cynical and fearful and told that it can't be done, then it doesn't. I'm running for president because I want to tell them, yes, we can. And that's why I think they're responding in such large numbers.

Cue the political science eye-roll. The American people were not "determined" that healthcare reform per se had to occur. You can't read the results of the 2008 wave election as a "mandate" for a specific policy. In the aftermath, the electoral tide went back out with a vengeance. But it's also true that in two years of campaigning Obama's words did inspire people, that the American people were hungry for change after Bush, that Obama made a broad and conceptually coherent case for moving the center of American politics back to the left with a renewed commitment to shared prosperity and investment in the common good, and that healthcare reform was at the center of that case. True too that the results of that election gave him enough of a majority to persist, even when relentless Republican misinformation and bad-faith negotiation and delay eroded public support. Obama also **used the bully pulpit at crucial point**s, if not to rally public opinion, at least **to re-commit wavering Democrats -**- and also to convince the public, as he enduringly has, that he was more of a **good faith negotiator**, more willing to compromise, than the Republicans. Those pressure points were the September 2009 speech he gave to a joint session of Congress, and the remarkable eight-hour symposium he staged with the leadership of both parties in late February 2010 to showcase the extent to which the ACA incorporated past Republican proposals and met goals allegedly shared by both parties, as well as his own bend-over-backwards willingness to incorporate any Republican ideas that could reasonably be cast as advancing those goals. In a series of posts about Ronald Reagan, Brendhan Nyhan has demonstrated that presidential rhetoric generally does not sway public opinion. Savvy politicians channel public opinion; transformative ones seize an opportunity when their basic narrative of where the country needs to go aligns with a shift in public opinion, usually in response to recent setbacks or turmoil. Obama, like Reagan, effected major change in his first two years because he caught such a wave -- he **amassed the political capital**, and he spent it, and we got what he paid for. The force from outside -- a wave election -- empowered Obama to work change from inside in a system that reached a new peak of dysfunctionality. Klein's also objects to Obama's pitch for how to effect change going forward. In 2011, he notes, Obama highlighted the substantial change won from the messy inside game of legislating, touting the long list of legislative accomplishments of the 111th Congress. In election season, he has reverted to a keynote of his 2008 campaign: change comes from you, the electorate; it happens when ”the American people … put pressure on Congress to move these things forward.” Klein regards this as election season hooey: But while this theory of change might play better, it’s the precise theory of change that the last few years have shattered. Whatever you want to say about the inside game, it worked. Legislation passed. But after the midterm elections, it stopped working. And so the White House moved towards an outside game strategy, where ”the American people … put pressure on Congress to move these things forward.” Perhaps the most public example was Obama’s July 2011 speech, in which he said: I’m asking you all to make your voice heard. If you want a balanced approach to reducing the deficit, let your member of Congress know. If you believe we can solve this problem through compromise, send that message. So many Americans responded that Congress’s Web site crashed. But Obama didn’t get his “balanced approach,” which meant a deal including taxes. Klein goes on to recount that throughout the past year of confrontation with the GOP, pushing a jobs package that had broad popular support, Obama won only one minor victory, extension of the payroll tax cut. He then reverts to two political science tenets: presidential advocacy entrenches the opposition, and it can't move popular opinion. But I think he misreads Obama's pitch, strategy and record on several counts. First, he **understates Obama's** (and the Democrats') **successes in the year of confrontation** that has followed the debt ceiling debacle. He writes off the payroll tax cut and unemployment benefit extension as small beer. But this was actually a near-total victory in two stages against entrenched opposition, and it won Obama some vital back-door stimulus for the second year running in the wake of the GOP House takeover. It was followed by a similar GOP cave-in on maintaining low student loan interest rates -- and then again, by the collapse of the House GOP effort to renege on the Budget Control Act and impose still more spending cuts. Presidential rhetoric may not change the public mind. But when it's in sync with voter's propensities, **it can deploy public opinion to bring pressure to bear on the opposition.** Second, it's true that under threat of GOP debt ceiling extortion, Obama successfully marshaled public opinion in favor of his "balanced" approach to deficit reduction but wasn't able to use that pressure to move the GOP off their no-new-taxes intransigence. **But that battle ain't over yet**, and popular support for Obama's position **is political capital that's still in the bank**. **In the upcoming fiscal cliff negotiations, Obama**, if he wins reelection, **will have the whip hand,** given the expiration of the Bush tax cuts and Republican teeth-gnashing over the defense cuts in the sequester. Speaking of which, Obama's refusal to intervene in the supercommittee negotiations as Republicans stonewalled once again over any tax hikes **banked him further capital in this upcoming fight**. Republicans are screaming much louder than Democrats about the sequester, disastrous though the cuts may be on the domestic side. Third, it's rational for Obama to recast his bid for change in election season, because of course he's seeking further "change" from the outside, i.e., more Democrats elected to Congress. He's not going to win a mandate as in 2008, or, most likely, majorities in both houses of Congress. But he has to make the pitch for being granted renewed tools to advance his agenda. Finally, a key part of Obama's "you are the change" pitch in his convention speech was a frank call to play defense -- to protect the changes wrought in his first term and fend off the further capture of the electoral process and the nation's resources by the oligarchy the GOP represents: If you turn away now – if you buy into the cynicism that the change we fought for isn’t possible … well, change will not happen. If you give up on the idea that your voice can make a difference, then other voices will fill the void: lobbyists and special interests; the people with the $10 million checks who are trying to buy this election and those who are making it harder for you to vote; Washington politicians who want to decide who you can marry, or control health-care choices that women should make for themselves.

#### Plan kills Obama

Petroleum Intelligence Weekly, 1/9/12, Obama Plays Safe on Energy Policy, Lexis

With less than a year to go **until he faces re-election**, US President Barack **Obama is trying to avoid controversial energy policy decisions**, postponing the finalization of restrictions on oil refinery and power plant emissions and delaying the approval of a major crude pipeline project. The president’s caution will prolong the status quo on issues where the industry both opposes and supports the administration’s plans, and also illustrates what's at stake for energy policy depending on whether or not Obama is given another four years in office. Most of Obama's original campaign **pledges on promoting alternatives to fossil fuels** and tackling climate change **have not passed muster with Congress**, most notably an ambitious plan for national carbon controls, a subsequent toned-down clean energy standard floated after the carbon legislation failed, and repeated efforts to repeal $30 billion-$40 billion worth of oil industry tax deductions over 10 years ( PIW May9'11 ). The one exception has been the passage of $90 billion in clean energy funding as part of an economic stimulus bill passed early in Obama's term, but **the White House has been unable to repeat** this **success in other energy policy areas** ( PIW Feb.23'09 ).

#### Presidential leadership is key to a compromise – the alternative is the collapse of hegemony, a double-dip recession, and war in the Middle East

Hutchison, U.S. Senator from the great state of Texas, 9/21/2012

(Kay Bailey, “A Looming Threat to National Security,” States News Service, Lexis)

Despite warnings of the **dire consequences**, **America is teetering at the edge of a fiscal cliff**, with January 1st, 2013 as the tipping point. On that date, **unless Congress and the White House can reach agreement** on how to cut the federal deficit, all taxpayers will be hit with higher taxes and deep cuts - called "sequestration" - will occur in almost all government spending, disrupting our already weak economy and putting our national security at risk.

According to the House Armed Services Committee, if sequestration goes into effect, it would put us on course for more than $1 trillion in defense cuts over the next 10 years. What would that mean? A huge hit to our military personnel and their families; devastating cuts in funding for critical military equipment and supplies for our soldiers; and **a** potentially **catastrophic blow to our** national defense and **security capabilities** in a time of increasing violence and danger.

All Americans feel a debt of gratitude to our men and women who serve in uniform. But Texas in particular has a culture that not only reveres the commitment and sacrifice they make to protect our freedom, we send a disproportionate number of our sons and daughters to serve.

The burden is not borne solely by those who continue to answer the call of duty, but by their families as well, as they endure separation and the anxiety of a loved one going off to war. These Americans have made tremendous sacrifices. They deserve better than to face threats to their financial security and increased risks to their loved ones in uniform, purely for political gamesmanship.

Sequestration would also place an additional burden on our economy. In the industries that support national defense, as many as 1 million skilled workers could be laid off. With 43 straight months of unemployment above 8 percent, it is beyond comprehension to add a virtual army to the 23 million Americans who are already out of work or under-employed. **Government and private economic forecasters warn that sequestration will push the country back into recession next year**.

The recent murder of our Ambassador to Libya and members of his staff, attacks on US embassies and consulates and continued riots across the Middle East and North Africa are stark reminders that great portions of the world remain volatile and hostile to the US. **We have the mantle of responsibility that being the world's lone super-power brings**. **In the absence of U.S. military leadership**, **upheaval in the Middle East would be worse**. **As any student of history can attest**, **instability does not confine itself to national borders**. **Strife that starts in one country can spread like wildfire across a region**.

Sequestration's cuts would reduce an additional 100,000 airmen, Marines, sailors and soldiers. That would leave us with the smallest ground force since 1940, the smallest naval fleet since 1915 and the smallest tactical fighter force in the Air Force's history. With the destabilization in the Middle East and other areas tenuous, we would be left with a crippled military, **a diminished stature internationally and a loss of technological** research, development and **advantage** - just as actors across the globe are increasing their capabilities.

Sequestration can still be avoided. **But that will require leadership from the President** that has thus far been missing. Congress and the White House must reach a long-term agreement to reduce $1 trillion annual budget deficits, without the harsh tax increases that could stall economic growth and punish working families.

#### Middle East goes nuclear

James A. **Russell,** Senior Lecturer, National Security Affairs, Naval Postgraduate School, ‘9 (Spring) “Strategic Stability Reconsidered: Prospects for Escalation and Nuclear War in the Middle East” IFRI, Proliferation Papers, #26, http://www.ifri.org/downloads/PP26\_Russell\_2009.pdf

Strategic stability in the region is thus undermined by various factors: (1) asymmetric interests in the bargaining framework that can introduce unpredictable behavior from actors; (2) the presence of non-state actors that introduce unpredictability into relationships between the antagonists; (3) incompatible assumptions about the structure of the deterrent relationship that makes the bargaining framework strategically unstable; (4) perceptions by Israel and the United States that its window of opportunity for military action is closing, which could prompt a preventive attack; (5) the prospect that Iran’s response to pre-emptive attacks could involve unconventional weapons, which could prompt escalation by Israel and/or the United States; (6) the lack of a communications framework to build trust and cooperation among framework participants. These systemic weaknesses in the coercive bargaining framework all suggest that escalation by any the parties could happen either on purpose or as a result of miscalculation or the pressures of wartime circumstance. Given these factors, it is disturbingly easy to imagine scenarios under which a conflict could quickly escalate in which the regional antagonists would consider the use of chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons. It would be a mistake to believe the nuclear taboo can somehow magically keep nuclear weapons from being used in the context of an unstable strategic framework. Systemic asymmetries between actors in fact suggest a certain increase in the probability of war – a war in which escalation could happen quickly and from a variety of participants. Once such a war starts, events would likely develop a momentum all their own and decision-making would consequently be shaped in unpredictable ways. The international community must take this possibility seriously, and muster every tool at its disposal to prevent such an outcome, which would be an unprecedented disaster for the peoples of the region, with substantial risk for the entire world.

## solvency

Nuclear’s too expensive

Folbre, professor of economics – University of Massachusetts, Amherst, 3/26/’12

(Nancy, “The Nurture of Nuclear Power,” <http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/03/26/the-nurture-of-nuclear-power/>)

Remember the brouhaha about $563 million in Obama administration loan guarantees to Solyndra, the solar panel manufacturer that went belly up last fall? Neither President Obama nor Republicans in Congress have voiced opposition to an expected $8.3 billion Energy Department guarantee to help the Southern Company, a utility giant, build nuclear reactors in Georgia. Pressed to respond to the comparison, Representative Cliff Stearns, Republican of Florida and chairman of the Energy and Commerce subcommittee on oversight and investigations, explained that the loan guarantee for nuclear power plant construction was for a “proven industry that has been successful and has established a record.” The nuclear power industry has certainly established a record – for terrifying accidents. Most recently, the Fukushima Daiichi disaster in Japan led to the evacuation of 90,000 residents who have yet to return home and to the resignation of the prime minister. It prompted the German government to begin phasing out all nuclear generation of electricity by 2022. Yet the industry has proved remarkably successful at garnering public support in the United States, ranging from public insurance against accident liability to loan guarantees. An article last year in The Wall Street Journal observed that subsidies per kilowatt hour during its initial stages of development far exceeded those provided to solar and wind energy technologies. According to a detailed report published by the Union of Concerned Scientists, subsidies to the nuclear fuel cycle have often exceeded the value of the power produced. Buying power on the open market and giving it away for free would have been less costly. Heightened concerns about safety have driven recent cost estimates even higher, scaring off most private investors. Travis Hoium, an analyst who has written extensively about the industry on the investment Web site The Motley Fool, calls nuclear power a dying business. In an article, “Warren Buffett Wants a Subsidy From You,” he clearly explains recent efforts to shift risk from investors to ratepayers by allowing utilities to charge for construction in advance. Investor interest in nuclear-generated electricity has declined partly as a result of the boom in shale gas extraction. But energy sources that don’t increase carbon emissions are also playing a major role, with wind, hydropower and other renewables projected to provide about 30 percent of expected additions to power generation capacity in the United States between 2010 and 2035.

Multiple barriers prevent nuclear investment

Fahring, JD – U Texas School of Law, ‘11

(T.L., 41 Tex. Envtl. L.J. 279)

V. Potential Problems with the Combined Government Measures to Promote New Nuclear Construction In 2007, a developer filed with the NRC the first application for a new reactor in nearly thirty years. n263 To date, the NRC has received eighteen COL applications for twenty-eight reactors. n264 The NRC has granted four ESPs and four Standard Design Certifications. n265 Applicants have filed seventeen applications for a Standard Design Certification. n266 The DOE has another seven Standard Design Certifications under review. n267 This recent spate of licensing activity after so long a dry-spell arguably owes much to the measures the United States has taken as of late to promote new nuclear [\*303] development. To the extent that these applications have been filed, these measures have been a success. But this initial success does not necessarily ensure that new nuclear construction will take place: In announcing the new reactor license applications ... utilities have made clear that they are not committed to actually building the reactors, even if the licenses are approved. Large uncertainties about nuclear plant construction costs still remain ... All those problems helped cause the long cessation of U.S. reactor orders and will need to be addressed before financing for new multibillion-dollar nuclear power plants is likely to be obtained. n268 A number of obstacles, thus, still might stand in the way of new nuclear construction in the United States. A. Developers Have Not Followed the Ideal Sequence in the NRC's Streamlined Licensing Process First, developers have failed to follow the ideal steps of the NRC's streamlined licensing process. n269 NRC Commissioner Gregory Jaczko explains: The idea was that utilities could get a plant design completed and certified and a site reviewed first ... They could then submit an application that simply references an already certified design and an approved early site permit. But almost no one is following that ideal process. Instead, we are once again doing everything in parallel ... n270 Developers also are delaying review of their applications. n271 They have put four of the seventeen COL applications filed with the NRC on hold. n272 They also have yet to complete the seventeen applications for designs filed with the NRC and are continuing to revise the four designs under review. n273 A possible explanation for the problems with the streamlined licensing process is that much of 2005 EPACT provides incentives only for the first few developers to proceed with new nuclear construction. In particular, the production tax credits, as construed by the IRS, were available only for the first 6,000 megawatts of additional nameplate capacity filed through COL applications with the NRC. n274 All COL applications that the NRC has received were filed after IRS Notice 2006-40, which provided this guidance. n275 "The deadline for automatic eligibility for the tax credit appears to [have provided] a strong incentive for nuclear plant applicants to file with the NRC by [\*304] the end of 2008 ..." n276 Given this incentive, developers might have filed quickly and with incomplete information, in the process failing to follow the NRC's ideal streamlined licensing sequence. n277 These problems with the licensing process could be detrimental to continued nuclear development. Defects in the licensing process led to cost overruns in the 1970s and 1980s, which dissuaded developers from undertaking any new nuclear construction for nearly thirty years. n278 Continued problems would constitute an input cost uncertainty to developers who have not yet filed applications, which might cause them to further delay new construction. B. The Reduction in Reactor Licensing Hearing Formality Might Cause a Public Backlash Second, insofar as the NRC's reduction in nuclear licensing hearing formality limits public participation in the licensing process, it could lead to a public backlash. "Public involvement has two basic functions: it permits the raising of issues that will improve the safety of nuclear power plants, and it enhances the transparency and level of confidence and trust that the public can have in nuclear regulation and decision-making." n279 Measures that limit public participation in the nuclear licensing process undermine both of these functions. n280 As noted in the overview of the history of U.S. nuclear construction above, nuclear construction has always been extremely sensitive to changes in public opinion. In 2009, a majority of the American public favored nuclear power. n281 However, only a minority of the public favored new nuclear construction in the area in which they live. n282 After the nuclear crisis at the Fukushima Daiichi plant in Japan, U.S. public support for nuclear power fell sharply, with polls showing that many feared a major nuclear accident in this country. n283 Limiting public participation in the licensing process could decrease public support by undermining any trust that the public has in the regulatory system. This defect could lead to more litigation and a repeat of U.S. nuclear construction's nightmarish cost overruns of the 1970s and 1980s, thus increasing input cost uncertainty to developers. n284 [\*305] C. Costs for Nuclear Construction Still Might Rise Over Time Third, much of 2005 EPACT is animated by the belief that costs will be highest for the first few reactors to be built: as developers build subsequent units, costs will go down. n285 The history of U.S. nuclear development shows this assumption not necessarily to be the case. n286 Historically, costs of nuclear construction rose over time. Nothing indicates that the costs of nuclear construction will do otherwise now. n287 D. The Production Tax Credit Might Not Be Sufficient to Reduce Costs of Construction in a Reactor Series Fourth, even if conditions are such that costs will decrease over time, the production tax credits in 2005 EPACT might not be sufficient to reduce costs in a reactor series. n288 The credits go to those first reactors up to 6,000 megawatts in nameplate capacity filed with the NRC. n289 However, at the time of this note, the NRC has approved four standard design certifications. n290 Because each COL has a reactor with a nameplate capacity between 1,200-1,500 megawatts, at most only four to five reactors would be covered. n291 Therefore, only one or two reactors from each design certification would be built that would qualify for the credit. n292 Thus, this tax credit might not be enough to reduce costs through series production so that subsequent units would be economically viable without a tax credit. n293 Moreover, the production tax credit does not have any adjustment for inflation, which could decrease its benefits to the first new plant to come online. n294 Because the benefit of the production tax credit is uncertain, developers have less incentive to go through with new construction.

Waste destroys long term industry growth and causes public backlash

GAO, Government Accountability Office, April ‘11

("Commercial Nuclear Waste, Effects of a Termination of the Yucca Mountain Repository Program and Lessons Learned," GAO-11-229)

The proposed termination of Yucca Mountain, which had been planned to be opened in 2020, will likely prolong storage at reactor sites, which would increase on-site storage costs. Because of delays in opening the Yucca Mountain repository, on-site storage at commercial nuclear facilities has been the de facto near-term strategy for managing spent nuclear fuel. Most spent nuclear fuel is stored at reactor sites, immersed in pools of water designed to cool it and isolate it from the environment. With the extension of on-site storage because of the delays in opening Yucca Mountain, some reactors are running out of space in their pools and have turned to dry-cask storage systems. In 2009, we reported that such systems for reactor operators cost from about $30 million to $60 million per reactor, with costs increasing as more spent nuclear fuel is added to dry storage.34 We also reported that the spent nuclear fuel would likely have to be repackaged about every 100 years, although experts said this is uncertain and research is under way to better understand the longevity of dry-cask systems. This repackaging could add from about $180 million to nearly $500 million, assuming initial repackaging operations, with costs dependent on the number of casks to be repackaged and whether a site has a transfer facility, such as a storage pool. Prolonging on-site storage would add to the taxpayer burden by increasing the substantial liabilities that DOE has already incurred due to on-site storage at commercial nuclear reactors. Were DOE to open Yucca Mountain in 2020, as it had planned, and begun taking custody of spent nuclear fuel, it would still have taken decades to take custody of the entire inventory of spent nuclear fuel. Assuming a 2020 opening of Yucca Mountain, DOE estimated that the total taxpayer liabilities for the backlog as of 2020 would be about $15.4 billion and would increase by $500 million for each year of delay thereafter.35 It is important to recognize that these liabilities are outside of the nearly $15 billion already spent on developing a repository and the estimated $41 to $67 billion still to be spent if the Yucca Mountain repository were to be constructed and become operational, most of the cost of which is borne by the Nuclear Waste Fund. Instead, these liabilities are borne by taxpayers because of the government’s failure to meet its commitment to take custody of the waste has resulted in lawsuits brought by industry.36 Furthermore, not all of the lawsuits have been resolved and industry has claimed that the lawsuits still pending could result in liabilities of at least $50 billion. Some former DOE officials and industry and community representatives stated that the termination of the Yucca Mountain program could result in an additional delay in the opening of a repository by at least 20 years, which would lead to additional DOE liabilities in the billions of dollars. Until a final disposition pathway is determined, there will continue to be uncertainties regarding the federal government’s total liabilities. At decommissioned reactor sites, prolonged on-site storage could further increase costs or limit opportunities for industry and local communities, according to industry and community representatives.37 As long as the spent nuclear fuel remains, the sites would not be available for other purposes, and the former operators may have to stay in business for the sole purpose of monitoring, storing, and providing costly security for the fuel. Local communities could lose the potential use of the site for alternative purposes, potentially impacting economic growth and tax revenue. For example, according to an industry representative, a local government in Illinois would like to encourage development of property fronting Lake Michigan near a shutdown nuclear reactor planned for decommissioning. A local government official stated in an interview with the media, however, that it may be difficult to develop and sell the property because prospective buyers may feel uneasy about living next to a site storing spent nuclear fuel. Similarly, a local government official from Minnesota expressed concern about having to provide security and emergency response for the Prairie Island reactor site and its spent nuclear fuel because tax revenues from the facility will decrease substantially after it is decommissioned. However, these issues may not affect all reactor sites. For example, officials in Oregon told us they did not feel dry-cask storage at Trojan, a decommissioned reactor, adversely affected economic growth or tax revenue. This site is about 42 miles north of Portland, Oregon, and is not in a major metropolitan area. Prolonging on-site storage could also increase opposition to expansion of the nuclear industry, according to state and industry officials. Without progress on a centralized storage facility or repository, some experts have stated that some state and local opposition to reactor storage site recertification will likely increase and so will challenges to nuclear power companies’ applications for reactor license extensions and for new reactor licenses.38 For example, Minnesota officials noted that negative public reaction to a proposal to increase dry-cask storage at a nuclear plant led the state legislature to impose a moratorium on new nuclear plants. At least 12 other states have similar prohibitions on new construction, 9 of which can be lifted when a means of disposing of spent nuclear fuel can be demonstrated. Representatives from some tribal and environmental organizations said they were concerned with the long-term on-site storage of spent nuclear fuel. They said nuclear plants should take additional measures to ensure the safety and security of dry-cask storage sites, and they have raised these concerns in objecting to the relicensing of commercial reactors in Minnesota and New Jersey. For instance, tribal officials from the Prairie Island Indian Community in Minnesota told us they opposed relicensing the Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant because of environmental and safety concerns they have about living just 600 hundred yards from spent nuclear fuel.

## prolif

Proliferation is slow, doesn’t cascade, and doesn’t cause conflict – 60 years of empirics prove

DeGarmo 2011

 Denise, professor of international relations at Southern Illinois University, “Proliferation Leads to Peace”

Unfortunately, while **the fear of proliferation is pervasive, it is unfounded and lacks an understanding of the evidence. Nuclear proliferation has been slow**. From [1945 to 1970](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_states_with_nuclear_weapons), only six countries acquired nuclear weapons: United States, Russia, United Kingdom, France, China, and Israel. **Since the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty came into effect in 1970, only three countries have joined the nuclear club: India, Pakistan, and North Korea. In total, only .05% of the world’s states have nuclear weapons in their possession.** Supporters of non-proliferation seem to overlook the fact that there are states currently capable of making nuclear weapons and have chosen not to construct them, which illustrates the seriousness with which states consider their entrance into the nuclear club. Included on this list are such actors as: [Japan, Argentina, Brazil, Egypt, Iran, South Korea, Taiwan, and South Africa](http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/svr_nuke.htm). The attraction of nuclear weapons is multifold. Nuclear weapons enhance the international status of states that possess them and help insecure states feel more secure. States also seek nuclear capabilities for offensive purposes. It is important to point out that **while nuclear weapons have spread very slowly, conventional weapons have proliferated exponentially across the globe. The wars of the 21st century are being fought in the peripheral regions of the globe that are undergoing conventional weapons proliferation**. What the pundits of non-proliferation forget to mention are the many lessons that are learned from the nuclear world. Nuclear weapons provide stability just as they did during the Cold War era. The fear of [Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD)](http://atomicarchive.com/History/coldwar/page15.shtml) loomed heavily on the minds of nuclear powers through out the Cold War and continues to be an important consideration for nuclear states today. States do not strike first unless they are assured of a military victory, and the probability of a military victory is diminished by fear that their actions would prompt a swift retaliation by other states. In other words, states with nuclear weapons are deterred by another state’s second-strike capabilities. During the Cold War, the United States and Soviet Union could not destroy enough of the other’s massive arsenal of nuclear weapons to make a retaliatory strike bearable. Even the prospect of a small number of nuclear weapons being placed in Cuba by the Soviets had a great deterrent effect on the United States. Nothing can be done with nuclear weapons other than to use them for deterrent purposes. **If deterrence works reliably, as it has done over the past 60 plus years, then there is less to be feared from nuclear proliferation than there is from convention warfare**.

No impact—slow and stable

Kidd 10

Steve Kidd, June 8 2010. Head of Strategy & Research at the World Nuclear Association, where he has worked since 1995 [when it was the Uranium Institute]. (“Nuclear proliferation risk - is it vastly overrated?” June 8, 2010 Nuclear Engineering International, Lexis, )

A significant amount of media attention has recently attached itself to the nuclear security meeting convened by US president Barack Obama and the five-yearly review conference for the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which followed soon afterwards. The fear of so-called 'rogue nations' acquiring nuclear weapons, or terrorist organisations creating outrages by misuse of nuclear materials, clearly remains strong. Many column inches also continue to be devoted to various North Korean nuclear activities and to Iran's alleged intentions to pursue a weapons programme. There therefore remains a fear that this may cast a shadow over the nuclear renaissance, particularly as many people clearly believe that nuclear energy and bombs are merely two faces of the same coin. But it is surely not unreasonable to question whether these fears are being substantially inflated and possibly manipulated by various interest groups in order to suit their own purposes. There is, however, no doubt that nuclear materials could conceivably be diverted from a civil nuclear power programme into the production of nuclear weapons or alternatively, major fuel cycle processes (notably enrichment and reprocessing of used fuel) could be employed to produce weapons rather than fuel for civil reactors. Similarly, it is understandable that concerns over the security of civil nuclear facilities have multiplied since the 9/11 terrorist attacks in New York. The possibility of aircraft crashing into such plants has naturally now been raised, as have possible terrorist incursions at plants either to acquire materials for weapons or to misuse the facility to create an explosion or a major radioactive release (see also 'Security since September 11th,' NEI March 2010, pp 14-9]. Rather like the risks of operating nuclear power plants themselves, these possibilities largely boil down to assessing very low probability events which may have big consequences. Human beings are notoriously bad at this and frequently reach what seem to be illogical conclusions. This is highlighted by a recent book by a US academic, John Mueller, Atomic Obsession-Nuclear Alarmism from Hiroshima to Al-Qaeda (ISBN No 978-0195381368). Mueller argues very persuasively (but certainly also controversially) that the impact of nuclear weapons has been substantially overstated both in terms of their likely destructive power (in the hands of any party other than one of the five recognised nuclear weapons states) but also in their real impact on human history since 1945. He emphasizes how slow proliferation of weapons has been in reality, partly because the difficulties of acquiring nuclear materials and developing weapons technology are much greater than commonly stated, but also because all but a few countries have no real interest in acquiring weapons, as they make little sense beyond supposedly increasing national prestige. Similarly, the task of the atomic terrorist is far from simple. If it were as easy as many people claim, why haven't there been any incidents, even when the controls on nuclear materials were far looser than today? And why do terrorist incidents (with the possible exception of the sarin gas attack on the Tokyo subway in 1995) usually involve low tech methods, such as people attaching bombs to themselves or taking over commercial airlines armed with box cutters and then flying them into prominent buildings? There may not be, in reality, any substantive black market in nuclear materials, despite the stories we regularly hear of nuclear trafficking. The comparison sometimes made with narcotic drugs is not reasonable; although drug seizures are known to be the tip of a very large iceberg, controls on the production, trade and transport of nuclear materials are much stiffer and potential buyers are very limited in number. First, security considerations have been addressed by deploying additional armed personnel at facilities and by other measures to prevent incursions, while new nuclear plants are designed with the possibility of an aircraft impact much in mind. Although such events are clearly not impossible, the entire 50-year history of civil nuclear power contains nothing to suggest that the risks are other than very remote. Little can be done other than what has been accomplished already and the risks should certainly not be allowed to dominate the assessment of potential future actions. Indeed, critics of nuclear power are very bad at keeping things in perspective and fail to apply similar degrees of scrutiny to other plans. For example, should football stadiums not be licensed for 80,000 fans, simply because a direct aircraft strike during a game could conceivably kill many thousands? Should the walls of the stadium have to be several metres thick? Proliferation of nuclear materials and technology and their integration into weapons are notably more substantive risks, particularly as they will likely involve sovereign states with their greater resources above those of a terrorist organisation. Critics of nuclear power emphasise that designing a nuclear bomb itself is not particularly difficult (even if, as Mueller emphasises, actually manufacturing and delivering a weapon certainly is). So much of the world anti-proliferation regime is based on controls on fissile materials; if the necessary plutonium or highly enriched uranium is not available either by diversion from civil uses or production in a local facility, a weapon is impossible. It is therefore necessary for nuclear power critics to focus on alleged weaknesses in the international nuclear safeguards regime or in the security of nuclear materials transport, plus the possible spread of enrichment and reprocessing technologies to countries who may have an interest beyond normal civil uses. While there is no room for complacency, the real risks are actually as remote as those associated with nuclear facility security and mean that attempts to stiffen safeguards even further will encounter reasonable objections. Nevertheless, over the past 35 years, the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) safeguards system under the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) has been a conspicuous international success in curbing the diversion of civil uranium into military uses. Most countries have indeed renounced nuclear weapons, recognising that possessing of them would threaten rather than enhance national security. They have therefore embraced the NPT as a public commitment to use nuclear materials and technology only for peaceful purposes. Parties to the NPT agree to accept technical safeguards measures applied by the IAEA, complemented by controls on the export of sensitive technology from countries such as UK and USA through voluntary bodies such as the Nuclear Suppliers' Group (NSG). Safeguards require that operators of nuclear facilities maintain and declare detailed accounting records of all movements and transactions involving nuclear material. The aim is to deter the diversion of nuclear material from peaceful use by maximising the risk of early detection. At a broader level they provide assurance to the international community that countries are honouring their treaty commitments to use nuclear materials and facilities exclusively for peaceful purposes. In this way safeguards are a service both to the international community and to individual states, who recognise that it is in their own interest to demonstrate compliance with these commitments. All NPT non-weapons states must accept these full-scope safeguards, while facility-specific safeguards apply in the five weapons states (USA, Russia, UK, France and China) plus the non-NPT states (India, Pakistan and Israel). Iran and North Korea illustrate both the strengths and weaknesses of international safeguards. While accepting safeguards at declared facilities, Iran has allegedly set up equipment elsewhere in an attempt to enrich uranium to weapons grade (see also 'Figuring out Fordow,' NEI March 2010, pp20-2]. North Korea used research reactors (not commercial electricity-generating reactors) and a reprocessing plant to produce some weapons-grade plutonium. The weakness of the NPT regime lies in the fact that no obvious diversion of material has been involved. In both countries, the uranium used as fuel probably came from indigenous sources, and the countries themselves built the nuclear facilities concerned, without being declared or placed under safeguards arrangements. The greatest risk of nuclear weapons proliferation has traditionally rested with countries which have not joined the NPT and which have significant unsafeguarded nuclear activities. India, Pakistan and Israel are in this category. While safeguards apply to some of their activities, others remain beyond scrutiny. A further concern is that countries may develop various sensitive nuclear fuel cycle facilities and research reactors under full NPT safeguards and then subsequently opt out of the NPT. This is the argument for moving to some kind of intrinsic proliferation resistance in the fuel cycle, where there are a number of ideas, previously floated many years ago, which keep on being revamped. One key principle is that the assurance of non-proliferation must be linked to assurance of supply and services in the nuclear fuel cycle to any country embracing nuclear power. Various proposals for fuel banks and multinational fuel cycle centres may aim to guarantee the supply of nuclear fuel and services for bona fide uses, thereby removing the incentive for countries to develop indigenous fuel cycle capabilities. Yet there is clearly a risk here of dividing the world into 'good guys' and 'bad guys,' in a politically discriminatory way. Already, some international fuel cycle proposals have raised the ire of major developing countries like Brazil and South Africa. The real problem is that nuclear non-proliferation and security have powerful lobby groups behind them, largely claiming to have nothing against nuclear power as such, apart from the dangers of misuse of nuclear technology. In fact in Washington DC, home of the US federal government, there is a cottage industry of lobby groups dedicated to this. Those who oppose their scaremongering (and it essentially amounts to no more than this) are castigated as being in the industry's pocket or acting unresponsively to allegedly genuinely expressed public fears. Pointing out that very few new countries will acquire nuclear power by even 2030, and that very few of these will likely express any interest in acquiring enrichment or reprocessing facilities, seems to go completely over their heads. In any case, nuclear fuel cycle technologies are very expensive to acquire and it makes perfect sense to buy nuclear fuel from the existing commercial international supply chain. This already guarantees security of supply, so moves towards international fuel banks are essentially irrelevant, while measures supposedly to increase the proliferation resistance of the fuel cycle are unwarranted, particularly if they impose additional costs on the industry. It is likely that more countries will foolishly choose to acquire nuclear weapons.

#### No threat – weak leadership and no recent attacks

**Zenko and Cohen 12**, \*Fellow in the Center for Preventive Action at the Council on Foreign Relations, \*Fellow at the Century Foundation, (Micah and Michael, "Clear and Present Safety," March/April, Foreign Affairs, www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/137279/micah-zenko-and-michael-a-cohen/clear-and-present-safety

 NONE OF this is meant to suggest that the United States faces no major challenges today. Rather, the point is that the problems confronting the country are manageable and pose minimal risks to the lives of the overwhelming majority of Americans. None of them -- separately or in combination -- justifies the alarmist rhetoric of policymakers and politicians or should lead to the conclusion that Americans live in a dangerous world.

Take terrorism. Since 9/11, no security threat has been hyped more. Considering the horrors of that day, that is not surprising. But the result has been a level of fear that is completely out of proportion to both the capabilities of terrorist organizations and the United States' vulnerability. On 9/11, al Qaeda got tragically lucky. Since then, the United States has been preparing for the one percent chance (and likely even less) that it might get lucky again. But al Qaeda lost its safe haven after the U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, and further military, diplomatic, intelligence, and law enforcement efforts have decimated the organization, which has essentially lost whatever ability it once had to seriously threaten the United States.

According to U.S. officials, al Qaeda's leadership has been reduced to two top lieutenants: Ayman al-Zawahiri and his second-in-command, Abu Yahya al-Libi. Panetta has even said that the defeat of al Qaeda is "within reach." The near collapse of the original al Qaeda organization is one reason why, in the decade since 9/11, the U.S. homeland has not suffered any large-scale terrorist assaults. All subsequent attempts have failed or been thwarted, owing in part to the incompetence of their perpetrators. Although there are undoubtedly still some terrorists who wish to kill Americans, their dreams will likely continue to be frustrated by their own limitations and by the intelligence and law enforcement agencies of the United States and its allies.

#### The taboo solves nothing

Colin S **Gray 99**, professor of international politics and strategic studies and the director of the Centre for Strategic Studies, University of Reading in England, “To Confuse Ourselves: Nuclear Fallacies”, <http://fds.oup.com/www.oup.co.uk/pdf/0-19-829624-X.pdf>

There is much to be said in praise of the taboo hypothesis. Unfortunately, the proposition that an international political taboo against the'use' (i.e. the threat or the employment) of nuclear weapons has coalesced, is coalescing, or might coalesce, has about as much validity as the proposition that major war is, is becoming, or soon will be, obsolete.59 In the decent opinion of truly civilized folk the use of nuclear weapons (let alone chemical or, heaven forbid, biological weapons) may well be far beyond the pale of acceptable options for statecraft; that, however, can never be the relevant issue. Most probably there is today extant a political taboo against nuclear weapons, per se, and certainly against the use of nuclear weapons, which is authoritative for most people and most polities. If ruling notions for all of world politics were determined by a crude head, or political unit, count, then indeed it would be true to point to the power and influence of a, or the, nuclear taboo. The reality of world politics in this second nuclear age is, alas, far removed from that just fantasized. Self-helping security communities cannot be influenced very usefully by a nuclear taboo, especially when the principal articulators of this taboo are citizens of contentedly and prospectively permanently nuclear-armed states. To put this concept in some context, there are social (and legal) taboos against incest (everywhere) and spitting in public (in some societies), but in neither of these cases are taboos able to cope with the truly hard cases ('necessity knows no proscriptive norms' to misquote Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg60). The idea that embattled polities with the most serious of security problems could be influenced conclusively by a Westernled nuclear taboo is close to absurd. Less absurd is the proposition that the somatization of nuclear arms that is largely implicit in the global nonproliferation regime which is capped by the NPT, might help inhibit the pace of further nuclear proliferation. A general delegitimization and 'deglorification' of nuclear arms should facilitate the efforts of those who seek to impede the path of would-be nuclear proliferants. That granted, the superordinate difficulty remains that supply-side anti-proliferation measures cannot succeed, unless success is claimed merely for delay. The central problem with the hypothesis of a nuclear taboo is that it endeavours to deny needs both of the logic of policy and the grammar of strategy, to resort to Clausewitzian phrasing.61 American adherents to the hypothesis of the importance of a nuclear taboo should explain why this taboo can carry authority, given that it is flatly and robustly contradicted in key senses by the strategic beliefs and policies of eight nuclear-weapon states. There is a nuclear taboo which stigmatizes nuclear threat or employment. But policymakers in the eight nuclear weapon states do not equate such stigmatization— or singularization, for a less pejorative rendering—with unusability. Nuclear weapons may be weapons of last resort—for us, at least—but last resort should not be confused with 'no resort1. More to the point, perhaps, is the question of how a nuclear taboo possibly can contribute usefully ciegrat to world peace with security, when this second nuclear age provides a buyer's market for fissile material, skills in nuclear-weapon design and industrial fabrication, and certainly for ballistic and air-breathing means of nuclear-weapon delivery? To show the absurdity of the hypothesis of a nuclear taboo is akin to demonstrating the folly in the United Nations. Neither critique really is fair, because neither subject can command the merit in its destiny. Practical demolition of the value in the hypothesis of a nuclear taboo and thoroughgoing criticism of the United Nations ultimately are futile exercises, because both are shooting at straw targets. The United Nations cannot reform until its members reform their approaches to world politics. Similarly, a nuclear taboo cannot assume solidly reliable significance until political-military conditions are permissive, in which case it will not be needed. It is just naive to believe that nuclear arms, or other WMD, can be rendered morally unfashionable to a point of policy insignificance.

#### US won’t exert nonproliferation leadership

Cleary 12

Richard Cleary, American Enterprise Institute Research Assistant, 8/13/12, Richard Cleary: Persuading Countries to Forgo Nuclear Fuel-Making, npolicy.org/article.php?aid=1192&tid=30

The cases above offer a common lesson: The U.S., though constrained or empowered by circumstance, can exert considerable sway in nonproliferation matters, **but** often **elects not to apply the most powerful tools at its disposal for fear of jeopardizing other objectives**. The persistent dilemma of how much to emphasize nonproliferation goals, and at what cost, has contributed to cases of **nonproliferation failure**. The inconsistent or incomplete application of U.S. power in nonproliferation cases is most harmful when it gives the impression to a nation that either sharing sensitive technology or developing it is, or will become, acceptable to Washington. **U.S. reticence** historically, with some exceptions, **to prioritize nonproliferation**—and in so doing reduce the chance of success in these cases—**does not leave room for** great **optimism about future U.S. efforts at persuading countries to forgo nuclear fuel-making**.

#### Nuclear energy cred fails—countries say no to US tech if it constrains them

Cleary 12

Richard Cleary, American Enterprise Institute Research Assistant, 8/13/12, Richard Cleary: Persuading Countries to Forgo Nuclear Fuel-Making, npolicy.org/article.php?aid=1192&tid=30

The examples above show the limitations of both demand and supply side efforts. Supply side diplomatic interventions, made before the transfer of technology, have been at times effective, particularly in precluding nuclear fuel-making in the short term and buying time for more lasting solutions. However, as the Pakistan and Brazil cases illustrated, supply side interventions are no substitute for demand side solutions: **Countries face political choices regarding nuclear fuel-making**. **A nation set upon an independent fuel-making capacity**, such as Pakistan or Brazil, **is unlikely to give up efforts because of supply side controls**. Multilateral fuel-making arrangements, as proposed repeatedly by the United States, have not materialized and therefore seem to have had little tangible influence.

#### Prolif resistant trade doesn’t exist—nuclear coop always increases risk of prolif

Fuhrmann 9

Matthew Fuhrmann, Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of South Carolina, Summer 2009, Spreading Temptation: Proliferation and Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation Agreements, http://belfercenter.hks.harvard.edu/files/Spreading-Temptation-Proliferation-and-Peaceful-Nuclear-Cooperation-Agreements.pdf

Recent research finds that countries receiving certain “sensitive” nuclear assistance are more likely to acquire nuclear weapons.126 For the reasons I argued above, the relationship between nuclear assistance and proliferation is broader. Training in nuclear engineering, the supply of research or power reactors, and the transfer of certain nuclear materials also affect proliferation. To test whether my results may be driven by a few sensitive deals, I excluded them from the coding of my independent variable. This type of sensitive agreement is extremely rare, so this change resulted in the removal of a small number of agreements. I then estimated all models displayed in table 4 with this alternate coding of the independent variable. **The findings** relevant to my argument **are** generally **unaltered when sensitive agreements are excluded** from my coding of atomic assistance.127

Conclusion

Aided by a new data set, this article systematically explored the relationship between civilian nuclear cooperation and nuclear proliferation. It argued that **civilian assistance and weapons proliferation are linked** because the former leads to the supply of technology and materials that have applications for nu- clear energy and nuclear weapons, and because civilian assistance establishes an indigenous base of knowledge in nuclear matters that could be useful for a weapons program. These linkages reduce the expected costs of a nuclear weapons program, making states more likely to begin such a campaign when they have accumulated peaceful assistance—especially when a crisis or security threat arises. Similarly, countries receiving civilian aid are more likely to acquire nuclear bombs because important technological hurdles are lowered.

The analysis conducted in this article lends support for these arguments, even when controlling for the other variables believed to influence proliferation. Other factors are also strong predictors of proliferation, but **peaceful nuclear cooperation is one of the more salient variables in explaining why atomic weapons spread**. Thus, this article suggests that students of proliferation should take greater stock of civilian nuclear assistance. This is particularly true given that the links between the peaceful and military uses of the atom appear broader than previously believed. **Even** seemingly “**innocuous” nuclear cooperation** such as providing training to nuclear scientists or supplying power/ research reactors **can produce deleterious effects**. **There is no such thing as “proliferation-proof” atomic assistance**.

link/impact - the discourse of proliferation fears creates a racialized division between us and them - Western ideology ensures nuclear apartheid between us and the ontologically different them

Hugh **Gusterson**, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 19**99**, Nuclear Weapons and the Other in the Western Imagination, Cultural Anthropology 14(1):111-143. American Anthropological Association.

According to the literature on risk in anthropology, shared fears often reveal as much about the identities and solidarities of the fearful as about the actual dangers that are feared (Douglas and Wildavsky 1982; Lindenbaum 1974). The immoderate reactions in the West to the nuclear tests conducted by India and Pakistan, and to Iraq's nuclear weapons program earlier, are examples of an entrenched discourse on nuclear proliferation that has played an important role in structuring the Third World, and our relation to it, in the Western imagination. This discourse, dividing the world into nations that can be trusted with nuclear weapons and those that cannot, dates back, at least, to the Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1970. The Non-Proliferation Treaty embodied a bargain between the five coun- tries that had nuclear weapons in 1970 and those countries that did not. Accord- ing to the bargain, the five official nuclear states (the United States, the Soviet 3 Union, the United Kingdom, France, and China) promised to assist other signatories to the treaty in acquiring nuclear energy technology as long as they did not use that technology to produce nuclear weapons, submitting to international in- spections when necessary to prove their compliance. Further, in Article 6 of the treaty, the five nuclear powers agreed to "pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament" (Blacker and Duffy 1976:395). One hundred eighty-seven countries have signed the treaty, but Israel, India, and Pakistan have refused, saying it enshrines a system of global "nuclear apartheid." Although the Non-Proliferation Treaty divided the countries of the world into nuclear and nonnuclear by means of a purely temporal metric —designating only those who had tested nuclear weapons by 1970 as nuclear powers—the treaty has become the legal anchor for a global nuclear regime that is increasingly legitimated in Western public discourse in racialized terms. In view of recent developments in global politics—the collapse of the Soviet threat and the recent war against Iraq, a nuclear-threshold nation in the Third World—the importance of this discourse in organizing Western geopolitical understandings is only growing. It has become an increasingly important way of legitimating U.S. military programs in the post-Cold War world since the early 1990s, when U.S. military leaders introduced the term rogue states into the American lexicon of fear, identifying a new source of danger just as the Soviet threat was declining (Klare 1995).

Thus in Western discourse nuclear weapons are represented so that "theirs" are a problem whereas "ours" are not. During the Cold War the Western discourse on the dangers of "nuclear proliferation" defined the term in such a way as to sever the two senses of the word proliferation. This usage split off the "vertical" proliferation of the superpower arsenals (the development of new and improved weapons designs and the numerical expansion of the stockpiles) from the "horizontal" proliferation of nuclear weapons to other countries, presenting only the latter as the "proliferation problem." Following the end of the Cold War, the American and Russian arsenals are being cut to a few thousand weapons on each side. However, the United States and Russia have turned back appeals from various nonaligned nations, especially India, for the nuclear powers to open discussions on a global convention abolishing nuclear weapons. Article 6 of the Non-Proliferation Treaty notwithstanding, the Clinton administration has declared that nuclear weapons will play a role in the defense of the United States for the indefinite future. Meanwhile, in a controversial move, the Clinton administration has broken with the policy of previous administrations in basi- cally formalizing a policy of using nuclear weapons against nonnuclear states to deter chemical and biological weapons (Panofsky 1998; Sloyan 1998). The dominant discourse that stabilizes this system of nuclear apartheid in Western ideology is a specialized variant within a broader system of colonial and postcolonial discourse that takes as its essentialist premise a profound Otherness separating Third World from Western countries. This inscription of Third World (especially Asian and Middle Eastern) nations as ineradicably different from our own has, in a different context, been labeled "Orientalism" by Edward Said (1978). Said argues that orientalist discourse constructs the world in terms of a series of binary oppositions that produce the Orient as the mirror image of the West: where "we" are rational and disciplined, "they" are impul- sive and emotional; where "we" are modern and flexible, "they" are slaves to ancient passions and routines; where "we" are honest and compassionate, "they" are treacherous and uncultivated. While the blatantly racist orientalism of the high colonial period has softened, more subtle orientalist ideologies endure in contemporary politics. They can be found, as Akhil Gupta (1998) has argued, in discourses of economic development that represent Third World nations as child nations lagging behind Western nations in a uniform cycle of development or, as Lutz and Collins (1993) suggest, in the imagery of popular magazines, such as National Geographic. I want to suggest here that another variant of contemporary orientalist ideology is also to be found in U.S. national security discourse.

Following Anthony Giddens (1979), I define ideology as a way of con- structing political ideas, institutions, and behavior which (1) makes the political structures and institutions created by dominant social groups, classes, and na- tions appear to be naturally given and inescapable rather than socially con- structed; (2) presents the interests of elites as if they were universally shared; (3) obscures the connections between different social and political antagonisms so as to inhibit massive, binary confrontations (i.e., revolutionary situations); and (4) legitimates domination. The Western discourse on nuclear proliferation is ideological in all four of these senses: (1) it makes the simultaneous ownership of nuclear weapons by the major powers and the absence of nuclear weapons in Third World countries seem natural and reasonable while problematizing at- tempts by such countries as India, Pakistan, and Iraq to acquire these weapons; (2) it presents the security needs of the established nuclear powers as if they were everybody's; (3) it effaces the continuity between Third World countries' nuclear deprivation and other systematic patterns of deprivation in the underde- veloped world in order to inhibit a massive north-south confrontation; and (4) it legitimates the nuclear monopoly of the recognized nuclear powers.

## china

**No accidental launch**

**Williscroft 10** (Six patrols on the *John Marshall* as a Sonar Technician, and four on the *Von Steuben* as an officer – a total of twenty-two submerged months. Navigator and Ops Officer on *Ortolan* & *Pigeon* – Submarine Rescue & Saturation Diving ships. Watch and Diving Officer on *Oceanographer* and *Surveyor*. “Accidental Nuclear War” http://www.argee.net/Thrawn%20Rickle/Thrawn%20Rickle%2032.htm)

Is there a realistic chance that we could have a nuclear war by accident? Could a ballistic submarine commander launch his missiles without specific presidential authorization? Could a few men conspire and successfully bypass built-in safety systems to launch nuclear weapons? The key word here is “realistic.” In the strictest sense, yes, these things are possible. But are they realistically possible? This question can best be answered by examining two interrelated questions. Is there a way to launch a nuclear weapon by accident? Can a specific accidental series of events take place—no matter how remote—that will result in the inevitable launch or detonation of a nuclear weapon? Can one individual working by himself or several individuals working in collusion bring about the deliberate launch or detonation of a nuclear weapon? We are protected from accidental launching of nuclear weapons by mechanical safeguards, and by carefully structured and controlled mandatory procedures that are always employed when working around nuclear weapons. Launching a nuclear weapon takes the specific simultaneous action of several designated individuals. System designers ensured that conditions necessary for a launch could not happen accidentally. For example, to launch a missile from a ballistic missile submarine, two individuals must insert keys into separate slots on separate decks within a few seconds of each other. Barring this, the system cannot physically launch a missile. There are additional safeguards built into the system that control computer hardware and software, and personnel controls that we will discuss later, but—in the final analysis—without the keys inserted as described, there can be no launch—it’s not physically possible. Because the time window for key insertion is less than that required for one individual to accomplish, it is physically impossible for a missile to be launched accidentally by one individual. Any launch must be deliberate. One can postulate a scenario wherein a technician bypasses these safeguards in order to effect a launch by himself. Technically, this is possible, but such a launch would be deliberate, not accidental. We will examine measures designed to prevent this in a later column. Maintenance procedures on nuclear weapons are very tightly controlled. In effect always is the “two-man rule.” This rule prohibits any individual from accessing nuclear weapons or their launch vehicles alone. Aside from obvious qualification requirements, two individuals must be present. No matter how familiar the two technicians may be with a specific system, each step in a maintenance procedure is first read by one technician, repeated by the second, acknowledged by the first (or corrected, if necessary), performed by the second, examined by the first, checked off by the first, and acknowledged by the second. This makes maintenance slow, but absolutely assures that no errors happen. Exactly the same procedure is followed every time an access cover is removed, a screw is turned, a weapon is moved, or a controlling publication is updated. Nothing, absolutely nothing is done without following the written guides exactly, always under two-man control. This even applies to guards. Where nuclear weapons are concerned, a minimum of two guards—always fully in sight of each other—stand duty. There is no realistic scenario wherein a nuclear missile can be accidentally launched...ever...under any circumstances...period!

#### Chinese nuclear posture is stable

Alagappa, 2009

Muthiah Alagappa, Distinguished Senior Fellow, East-West Center PhD, International Affairs, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, 2009, “The Long Shadow,” p.517-518.

The caution induced by nuclear weapons, their leveling effect, the strategic insurance they provide to cope with unanticipated contingencies, and general deterrence postures inform and circumscribe interaction among the major powers, reduce their anxieties, and constrain the role of force in their interaction. This enables major powers to take a long view and focus on other national priorities. Nuclear weapons feature primarily in deterrence and insurance roles. These roles are not necessarily threatening to other parties. Modernization of nuclear arsenals and the development of additional capabilities have proceeded at a moderate pace; they have produced responses but not intense strategic competition. The net effect has been stabilizing. The stabilizing effect of nuclear weapons in the Sino-American, Russo-American, and Sino-Indian dyads were discussed in Chapter 17. Here I will limit myself to making some additional points. Continuing deterrence dominance underlies China’s measured response to the U.S. emphasis on offensive strategies and its development of strategic missile defense. Perceiving these as undermining the robustness of its strategic deterrent force, China seeks to strengthen the survivability of its retaliatory force and is attempting to develop capabilities that would threaten American space-based surveillance and communications facilities in the event of hostilities. However, these efforts are not presented as a direct challenge to or competition with the United States. Beijing has deliberately sought to downplay the modernization of its nuclear force. This is not simply deception, but a serious effort to develop a strong deterrent force without entering into a strategic competition with the United States, which it cannot win due to the huge imbalance in military capabilities and technological imitations. Strategic competition will also divert attention and resources away from the more urgent modernization goals. A strong Chinese strategic deterrent force blunts the military advantage of the United States, induces caution in that country, and constrains its military option in the event of hostilities. Although Russia’s response to the U.S. development of offensive and strategic defense capabilities has been more vocal, it lacks specifics. Moscow also does not appear to have allocated significantly more resources to its nuclear force.

#### Relations are resilient, but the cooperation that their impacts assume is impossible

Harry **Harding 11**, founding dean of the School of Leadership and Public Policy at the University of Virginia, “Are China and the U.S. on a collision course?”, June 14, http://thinkingaboutasia.blogspot.com/2011/06/are-china-and-us-on-collision-course.html

In my judgment, it is highly unlikely for the relationship between the US and China to be primarily cooperative, at least in the short to medium term. The differences in values, political systems, interests, levels of development, and perceptions of the existing international order are simply too great for the two countries to find common ground on all issues, or even to find a mutually agreeable allocation of costs and benefits when they try to pursue common interests. Only a common interest that was massively compelling – say a widespread pandemic, another financial crisis, a global outbreak of terrorist activity targeted at both countries, or increasingly severe consequences of climate change – might produce a predominantly cooperative relationship. Fortunately, an essentially confrontational relationship is also unlikely, especially if one is primarily concerned with the risks of military conflict. The high degree of economic interdependence between the two countries has already created a relatively resilient relationship. The cost of military conflict, especially given the fact that both China and the US are nuclear powers, will be a significant deterrent against military conflict. Equally important, the probability of the most worrying of the trigger events identified above– a unilateral declaration of independence by Taiwan – is presently quite low, as is the risk that China would try to compel unification through the use of force.

#### Nuclear coop now

Mark Halper 12, Smart Planet, 6/26/12, U.S. partners with China on new nuclear, www.smartplanet.com/blog/intelligent-energy/us-partners-with-china-on-new-nuclear/17037

The U.S. Department of Energy is quietly collaborating with China on an alternative nuclear power design known as a molten salt reactor that could run on thorium fuel rather than on more hazardous uranium, SmartPlanet understands.

DOE’s assistant secretary for nuclear energy Peter Lyons is co-chairing the partnership’s executive committee, along with Jiang Mianheng from the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS), according to a March presentation by CAS on thorium molten salt reactors. Beijing-based CAS is a state group overseeing about 100 research institutes. It and the DOE have established what CAS calls the “CAS and DOE Nuclear Energy Cooperation Memorandum of Understanding.”

#### US nuclear tech leadership inevitable

BPC 12

Bipartisan Policy Center’s Nuclear Initiative, Co-chaired by Senator Pete Domenici and Dr. Warren F. “Pete” Miller, July 2012, Maintaining U.S. Leadership in Global Nuclear Energy Markets, http://bipartisanpolicy.org/library/report/maintaining-us-leadership-global-nuclear-energy-markets

Nuclear power already plays an important role in the U.S. energy supply mix: The nation’s existing fleet of 104 reactors currently accounts for close to 20 percent of overall electricity production. In many parts of the country, nuclear plants help to assure grid stability and have been a major source of cost-effective, low-carbon base-load power for decades. The NRC, the industry’s chief regulatory overseer, is expected to approve extension of the operating licenses for most of these plants to 60 years while striving for improved safety and increasingly efficient operations. At present, the domestic nuclear industry is looking at limited opportunities for expansion in terms of increasing the number of U.S. plants. Currently, four new Generation III+ nuclear reactors have been licensed by the NRC and are under construction in the Southeast. In addition, the Tennessee Valley Authority has restarted construction activities at Watts Bar II.

Given this near-term expansion, the United States will continue to be a world leader in the development of advanced reactor technologies, including Generation III+ advanced passive reactors and SMRs. International interest in developing new nuclear-generating capacity, on the other hand, presents potentially substantial business opportunities for the domestic nuclear industry. Commercial nuclear exports generate obvious economic benefits for U.S. firms and for the nation’s overall balance of trade. Importantly, they also help the United States retain a major role in the evolution and maintenance of international nuclear safety and nonproliferation regimes. Other nations not only look to the U.S. industry for operational expertise, they see the NRC as setting the international gold standard for safety and physical security regulation. DOE’s National Nuclear Security Administration, meanwhile, has a great deal of influence over the nonproliferation aspects of international fuel-cycle issues.

# 2NC

## AT: Investor Signal

State policies are a better signal for investors

Sinclair, 10

(JD-Cornell & Executive Director of Clean Energy States Alliance, “Federal Climate and Energy Legislation and the States: Legislative Principles

and Recommendations for a New Clean Energy Federalism,” April http://www.cleanegroup.org/assets/Uploads/2011-Files/Reports/CEGCleanEnergyFederalismv3April2010.pdf)

1. States should and will remain the laboratories of experimentation and innovation on technology and economic development because **most energy investment decisions are made at the state and/or local utility and customer level**. 2. State and local clean energy development decisions are **made closer to the markets, are often more politically durable and stable over time, and should be encouraged**. 3. There is no simple, standard or optimal clean energy program design and practice that will achieve carbon stabilization; instead, all states and local jurisdictions should be given adequate federal resources and assistance to create and implement a diverse portfolio of finance, technology, and policy tools to create the necessary fifty state programs to advance a clean energy future. 4. There are many existing, experienced and “best practice” state-based, clean energy institutions that deserve continued and expanded support for their decade-long successes in these areas. 5. States can develop **more nuanced and effective finance mechanisms that can leverage private sector development because they know their markets, their market players and their barriers to success**.

6. Bottom-up, distributed solutions that the states can provide have always proved the most responsive and nimble solutions that best respect the ever changing demands of locally regulated state energy investment decisions, which are the hallmark of the US energy sector. 7. States should be given express authority to enact climate and clean energy policy and laws that are more stringent and aggressive than the federal programs. Specific legislative principles and concepts should inform all recommendations regarding the role of states in future national climate and energy legislation. These overarching principles and concepts frame how the specific proposals made here should be envisioned and realized, and they address the core elements of this report: allowance funding for states, new state-based financing programs, and encouraging disruptive climate technology innovation. State Allowance Funding

For allowance funding to the states, Congress should: 1. Rely on the expertise of the existing state programs and agencies that have deployed clean energy over the last decade with tremendous success. 2. Defer to state expertise in the allocation or investment of allowance funding at the state level. 3. Provide states with significant flexibility and specific incentives to employ a broad portfolio of financing tools and strategies to accelerate clean energy deployment to reflect each state’s political and resource context. 4. Call on every state to seek out and develop, wherever possible, opportunities to leverage their emissions allocation-derived funding with associated private capital to the greatest extent possible. 5. Encourage coordination among states to follow best practices and develop effective, program investments based on the storehouse of experience that state clean energy programs offer. 6. Encourage states to use allowance funding to partner and pursue joint multistate clean energy projects and programs to reduce administrative costs and ensure coordinated technology commercialization activities across states and regions.

Viewed as more certain and predictable than the fed

Milford, 12

(President-Clean Energy Group, “Clean-Energy Finance to Beat Beltway Blues,” http://www.cleanegroup.org/blog/clean-energy-finance-to-beat-beltway-blues/)

As the country looks for new sources of clean energy finance while Congress remains paralyzed, we might have missed the most obvious funders that have been right under our noses for years. They are the public infrastructure finance agencies all over America that know how to raise capital at the scale needed in this sector. In turn, Congress and the Administration should look to new policies to support this emerging, state-based infrastructure financing trend.

Hundreds of billions of dollars are needed scale up renewable energy, energy efficiency and clean energy manufacturing support. To fill this gap, some are looking to the states, regions and localities, a return to federalism as an investment strategy. Federal gridlock reminds us again that **states have been the clean energy innovators**. State funds have raised and leveraged over $12 billion in clean energy investment in the last decade. And clean energy policy at the state level has been done on a relatively bipartisan basis, unlike in Washington. In this search for new forms of clean energy finance, a large group of state and local finance partners has been overlooked – the public authorities and other entities that do tax-exempt and taxable bond financing – a $3 trillion industry that has financed our nation’s infrastructure and public improvements, from bridges to hospitals to university expansion. In the U.S. over 50,000 state and local agencies help finance economic and community development. To date, these agencies have not been that active in clean energy, with the exception of a few projects; but they now want to aggressively move into clean energy financing. As to the capital they can raise, municipal bond issuers in March 2012 alone brought 1,196 deals to market worth $34.50 billion. That makes $78.3 billion in 2,927 deals in only the first three months of 2012. Let’s compare this scale to the possible declining federal support. Tax equity revenue generated for wind through the uncertain production tax credit was about $3.5 billion in 2011, while federal support for solar through various subsidies was about $2.5 billion. These amounts are what municipal bond authorities finance every few days, every week of the year, all across the country.

Now, these bonding instruments are not exact replacements for tax equity investment, but they could usher in new forms of finance strategies. These tools have the **potential to enlist major capital players such as institutional investors** and pension funds that look for **longer term, more predictable returns** from infrastructure bonds—creating a new investment profile for clean energy with **investors that finance at scale.** So far, there are some interesting emerging examples of bond financing in this space. In New Jersey, bond financing is being used to scale up solar installations though traditional public authority activity, now almost $200 million in investment. There are other models in energy efficiency finance and in other sectors that can be scaled up and replicated across the country.Oddly enough, until now no one has ever approached these public infrastructure finance agencies to work on clean energy in any systematic way across clean energy markets. Some good news is that the membership organization of these authorities, the Council of Development Finance Agencies or CDFA, has entered into a partnership with Clean Energy Group and state clean energy funds to begin to explore use of bonding tools to finance clean energy.

So we have a **unique financing situation for clean energy**. To grow a robust clean energy economy, we have a new group of financial players who know how to raise hundreds of billions of dollars for infrastructure investment. They are motivated to make significant new investments in clean energy using existing bond instruments. They have begun to make small moves into the clean energy space, with a handful of investments. They are interested in becoming major players. While the deadlock in Washington and the **uncertainty over federal support is** unwelcome, it need **not mean a death knell for** the clean **energy** industry. Instead, we have an opportunity to return to our federalist roots and look for our states, regions and local bonding agencies to begin to finance clean energy in the same way we scaled up the infrastructure that made America what it is today. At the same time, there are many ways for the Administration to help, from clarifying various tax exempt rules to favor clean energy bonds to considering other support mechanisms that put the states in the financing lead. Congress too has a role to play to create a more bottom up, federalist financing strategy for clean energy. At the very least, this new state-based policy conversation around infrastructure finance should begin now, to begin to shape a new clean energy investment strategy that does not rely so much on the whims of Washington.

Empirics

Milford, 10

(President-Clean Energy Group, “Innovation to Infrastructure: Clean Energy without Cap and Trade,” November, http://www.cleanegroup.org/assets/Uploads/InnovationtoInfrastructureCEGPaper11.10.10final.pdf)

Given this reality and the historical trends of state leadership in financing energy projects, the future of energy policy will not reside in Washington, if it ever did. Instead, **states will be central to any clean energy transformation in the U**.**S**. State clean energy funds — now in over 20 states with others implementing an array of clean energy programs — are the clean energy experts. State policies and programs are now the **main driving force for clean energy progress** in this country, because states view clean energy as a foundation of their environmental and economic development strategies. The most recent data show that between 1998 and 2009, states, through their own funds, have supported over 72,000 new, clean energy projects across the United States. To bring these projects to market over this eleven year period, states have invested $2.7 billion of their own public funds, almost a half a billion dollars in state funds in 2009 alone. This is separate and apart from any federal stimulus funds, a remarkable demonstration of the states’ commitment to clean energy as part of their future economic development strategies. This public investment, in turn, **leveraged at least $9.7 billion of additional private and public investment**. In other words, in the last decade, states have been responsible for generating more than $12 billion of public and private investment in clean energy — a truly sensational public investment success story.

Investors react to states

Milford, 12

(Sr. Fellow-Brookings & President-Clean Energy Group, “Leveraging State Clean Energy Funds for Economic Development,”

http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2012/1/11%20states%20energy%20funds/0111\_states\_energy\_funds)

Specifically, states should:

➤ Improve ongoing data collection and monitoring on clean energy industry strengths and weaknesses in the state

➤ Work with universities and research institutions to focus their intellectual attention on clean energy economic development research

➤ Identify clean energy industry clusters, value chains, jobs, and finance, their gaps and needs within each state

➤ Establish program metrics to measure program support, identify the best programs to advance, and which to modify or improve

Link clean energy funds with economic development entities, community development finance institutions (CDFIs), development finance organizations,and other stakeholders. Clean energy is a relatively new industrial sector. For this reason many state economic development agencies, development finance agencies, and CDFIs have yet to fully enter the space or develop programs to promote and finance clean energy in their states. But they are the ideal partners to work with clean energy funds to develop effective economic development programs. Economic development agencies are tasked with generating jobs, retaining existing jobs, and stimulating industrial and commercial growth and innovation in their state. To date, very few state economic development agencies have partnered with their states’ clean energy funds with a few notable exceptions. CDFIs are financial institutions that provide credit and financial services to underserved communities and in many areas they are the leading infrastructure finance experts. As mission-driven institutions, many CDFIs have lent to clean energy and sustainable development projects and businesses. But few CDFIs have successfully developed to scale a financing operation that incorporates clean energy measures within their traditional community development lending operations. CDFIs often do not have dedicated clean energy funds, and existing funding is typically limited to projects, whether energy efficiency or weatherization. At the local level, there is not yet in place a broader strategy for job and wealth creation, and virtually no focus on power generation (such as renewable energy or manufacturing support or workforce training). Development finance agencies are state, county and municipal agencies and authorities that provide or support economic development financing programs, including tax-exempt and taxable bonds, credit enhancement programs, and direct debt and equity investments. Throughout the U.S. over 50,000 state and local agencies exist to help finance development. Tax-exempt bonds have been used to invest in three quarters of the U.S. infrastructure representing a $3 trillion industry. To date, these agencies have not been that active in the clean energy space, although a few municipalities have financed solar projects through bond offerings. But there is a growing interest from this sector to become more involved in clean energy financing. Their entry into clean energy could bring much needed public and private capital.

In addition, other stakeholders such as state housing finance authorities and workforce development agencies have not effectively integrated clean energy strategies within their program deployment. And finally state academics could bring important analysis, research, and evaluation to bear on program and policy creation. These finance and economic development agencies should be working together with state clean energy funds, which bring dedicated revenue streams and years of experience in clean energy technologies and local markets, to develop and adapt the best clean energy economic development programs for their state.

## AT: Biz Con

State policies better for biz con—they have a proven method of working with all stakeholders

Northrop, 8

(Program Director for Sustainable Development-Rockefeller Brothers Fund, 6/3, “States Take the Lead on Climate” http://e360.yale.edu/content/feature.msp?id=2015)

Climate policy by state

But the states have far more to offer. They also have approved a host of energy-efficiency measures affecting all sectors of the economy. For example, one set of policies provides both emissions reductions and substantial economic savings from the building sector through improved building codes, insulation and weatherization programs, and lighting retrofits. From the waste management sector, waste reduction and recycling programs yield similar two-pronged benefits. These policies go hand-in-hand with others mandating that an increasing percentage of a state’s energy come from renewable sources, such as solar and wind power. Many states — chief among them California — have shown similar national leadership by significantly toughening auto emissions standards, leading Congress to increase national vehicle standards last December and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to challenge the states in court. The fact that so many states are acting with a similar impetus begs an important question: What would happen if you aggregated these policies and applied them on a national scale? One study conducted by the Center for Climate Strategies (CCS) — a non-partisan group that has worked on climate policymaking and analysis with many of these states — indicates that the adoption of a comprehensive, nationwide climate and energy policy would have substantial economic benefits. Using data from 12 states that are leaders in the field of climate change and energy, CSS calculated that were all 50 states to adopt similar rules and legislation, the aggregate economic savings would be $25 billion. The nation could achieve a 33% reduction in projected greenhouse gas emissions by 2020 — a common interim target — and save money doing so. Overall, the 27 states that have either adopted or are working on climate plans have targeted greenhouse gas reductions of 50 to 85 percent between 2040 and 2100, and their shorter term projections place them on this path. The states’ experiences also can be incorporated into a national cap-and-trade scheme. For example, in the first phase of the European Union’s Emissions Trading Scheme, the cap-and-trade mechanism increased costs without reducing emissions. Carbon credits had been over-allocated, so there was little pressure to make reductions; emitters, however, realized profits by passing on the cost of carbon credits to consumers, even though the credits had been given to them for free. Although a recalibration has since occurred and the lessons learned are being incorporated, it seems reasonable to expect that a US cap-and-trade system will encounter similar trials. The crafting of climate plans at the state level has been based upon a model of bipartisan consensus-building. Utility executives, trucking interests, builders, business leaders, and others have worked face-to-face with environmentalists and non-profit public interest groups to develop policy solutions that were in most cases adopted unanimously. One reason for that is simple: There is mounting evidence that these policies will create new jobs and promote broad economic development. As a result, back in the home districts of Congressional representatives, governors have created an informed network of stakeholders committed to responsible climate action and ready to support a needed national response. Federal partnership with state governments opens a new political possibility as well — the forging of a genuinely bipartisan national consensus to secure passage of crucial federal climate legislation.

## 1nc at: HTGRs

Empirics prove HTGRs don’t get commercialized

Thomas 11

Steve Thomas, professor of energy studies at the University of Greenwich, in London, Energy Policy, January 26, 2011, "The Pebble Bed Modular Reactor: An obituary", http://ac.els-cdn.com/S0301421511000826/1-s2.0-S0301421511000826-main.pdf?\_tid=7151dbfd244423b0a3fe0758968e5d30&acdnat=1345472561\_21893edaacae6a996d944ea9aab1086d

1.2. History of the HTGR Up to 1990, four major nuclear design countries had had major programmes to commercialize HTGR technology: Germany, USA, UK and France. All of these programmes came to nothing. Subsequently Japan, China and Russia, as well as South Africa, have shown an interest in the HTGR. It was the German technology that was taken up by South Africa and China. 1.2.1. Germany Germany has a long history of HTGR development using Pebble Bed technology. In 1959, Germany ordered the AVR plant (Arbeitsgemeinschaft Versuchsreaktor) built at the Julich govern- ¨ ment nuclear research centre. This 15 MW (e) plant, ﬁnanced by the government, was supplied by a group led by the Brown Boveri and Krupp companies. It went critical in 1966, generating electricity a year later and continuing in service until 1989. It was based on the pebble bed concept under which the fuel and graphite moderator are in the form of tennis-ball size ‘pebbles’. These are continuously fed into the top of the reactor column and are continuously removed from the bottom. A pebble is expected to be used up to ten times before it would be too depleted to use. The design and dimensions of the fuel pebbles were the essentially the same for all successor Pebble Bed designs. AVR had a good reputation as a prototype, although, as argued later, this reputation is now in question. Its successor, THTR-300 (300 MW (e)) also used the pebble bed concept and was ordered in 1970. This too was subsidised by the government but also involved utility funding. The industrial grouping behind it, HRB, again centred on Brown Boveri but with support from General Atomic a US company that had built high temperature reactors but not of the Pebble Bed design in the USA. Subsequently, Siemens produced a modular design of HTGR using the pebble bed concept, but none were built. THTR-300 went critical in September 1983, but was only connected to the grid in November 1985 and was declared commercial 6 in June 1987. From June until October of that year, it operated at about two-thirds full-power, suffering a range of problems including difﬁculties with the fuel circulation system. It restarted in January 1988 for a couple of months, running at about two-thirds of its full power rating, until more repairs were necessary to the fuel circulation and collection system. It ran for another ﬁve months but was shut down due to damage in the gas ducts. Repairs were completed in February 1989. However, the plant remained closed on the orders of the safety regulator because of concerns about safety and the unwillingness of the various owners of the plant, including the federal government, to continue to provide subsidies to operate the plant. 7 THTR-300 suffered from a substantial number of other technical problems, some of which were speciﬁc to the pebble bed design (e.g. 18,000 damaged fuel pebbles, graphite dust formation, thermal insulation failure in the core bottom by overheating). In September 1989, the plant was permanently closed and, since 1997, has been in a state of ‘safe enclosure’, at least until 2027. Decommissioning is intended to be ﬁnished by 2080. 8 Siemens and ABB (the successor company to Brown Boveri after it merged with ASEA) pooled their expertise on HTGRs in 1988 at the instigation of the German government to form a new company called HTR GmbH, which developed the 200 MW (th) HTR-Modul reactor which was expected to produce about 80 MW (e). With little realistic prospect of sales in Europe, their strategy appears to have been to license the technology to countries such as the then Soviet Union, China, Japan and South Africa. 1.2.2. USA US development of HTGRs has been based on designs in which the fuel is prismatic, rather than in the form of pebbles. The USA was the ﬁrst country to generate electricity using an HTGR power plant, Peach Bottom 1, completed in 1967, which produced about 40 MW of electricity and operated until 1974. By the time it was complete, a demonstration plant had already been ordered, Fort St. Vrain, which produced 330 MW of power and went critical in 1974. Again the next phase got ahead of completion of the previous phase and orders for eight full-size plants of the HTGR design, for the ﬁrst time without any government subsidy, were placed from 1971 to 1974. Four of these were for units of 770 MW and four for units of 1160 MW, but little progress on these plants was made and all were cancelled in 1974–1975. General Atomic, the vendor, withdrew the design from the market because the orders would not have been proﬁtable and it had to compensate the customers. For example, General Atomic agreed to pay Delmarva Power & Light US$125 million to terminate contracts for the construction of two 770 MW reactors. 9 Experience with Fort St. Vrain was poor. Although it went critical in 1974, it did not produce power till 1976 and was not declared commercial until 1979. Over its ten years of commercial service till 1989, its average load factor (power produced as a percentage of theoretical output had the plant operated uninterrupted at full power) was 15 per cent, almost the lowest lifetime load factor ever achieved by a commercial nuclear power plant. 10 It was then retired, the site decommissioned and the plant replaced by a conventional gas-ﬁred generation plant. Work continues on the HTGR in the USA, for example, through part of the US government’s Generation IV research effort, the Next Generation Nuclear Plant (NGNP) programme, 11 which, optimistically, has an objective to have a prototype plant in operation by 2021. The main US private company throughout most of this period has been, and continues to be, General Atomic. In May 2010, Westinghouse, one of the partners in PBMR Ltd., which had won contracts under the NGNP programme, withdrew from the programme. 1.2.3. UK The UK was a pioneer of gas-cooled nuclear technology using graphite as moderator, but carbon dioxide gas as the coolant. This technology was used in the 11 commercial ‘Magnox’ power plants 12 and the seven commercial Advanced Gas-cooled Reactor power plants. Carbon dioxide is cheaper than helium but is not as efﬁcient and is corrosive. A working reactor using helium as coolant, the Dragon HTGR research reactor, was ordered in 1957, completed in 1964, and operated until 1974. It produced 20 MW of heat but did not have an electricity generation circuit. However, since 1964, HTGRs have not been the subject of serious consideration for orders in Britain. 1.2.4. France France’s initial commercial orders were also for carbon dioxide cooled, graphite moderated reactors. Five commercial-size units were built, with the expectation that helium would replace carbon dioxide in future orders. However, in 1968 American PWR technology was chosen to replace the existing designs as a result of strong pressure from the utility, and HTGR technology has not been seriously considered as an option for commercial orders since then. 1.2.5. Japan HTGR development of Japanese design has been underway at a slow pace since about 1990. A prototype reactor (HTTR) producing 30 MW thermal power but no electricity was completed in 1998, three years later than scheduled. There are no speciﬁc plans to build further HTGRs. 1.2.6. China In 1989, China signed a licensing deal with HTR GmbH to develop HTGRs in China using the pebble bed design and links with South Africa have been forged (see below). While there are plans to build a demonstration plant based on the PBMR design, these have continually slipped. In 2005, it was expected that a demonstration plant would be in service by 2010 13 but by 2009, the expected completion date was 2013. 14 Breeder reactors now seem the priority for reactor design development. 15 An experimental reactor, HTR-10 (10 MW of heat), based on the HTRModul concept, has been in operation since 2003.

## 2nc too expensive

Prefer our ev—recent trends show nuclear is crashing, but their authors always think that the Renaissance is around the corner

Maize, staff writer – POWER Magazine, 8/6/’12

(Kennedy, “A Bumpy Road for Nukes,” POWERnews)

Washington, D.C., 6 August 2012 — It’s been a rough road for nuclear advocates in the U.S. of late, although nothing seems to dent the Pollyanna armor of the nuclear crowd, always appearing to believe a revival is just over the horizon and headed into view. Here are a few fraught developments for the nuclear business that suggest the positive vision just might be a mirage. \* GE CEO Jeff Immelt in a recent interview with the Financial Times revealed a surprising and somewhat uncharacteristic realism with regard to the company’s nuclear future and that of its partner in radioactivity, Hitachi. In London for the Summer Olympics, Immelt told a reporter for the FT, “It’s really a gas and wind world today. When I talk to the guys who run the oil companies, they say look, they’re finding more gas all the time. It’s just hard to justify nuclear, really hard. Gas is so cheap, and at some point, really, economics rule.” For the nuclear industry, economics has always been the fundamental enemy – not the green-tinged, hairy anti-nuke activists, but the folks with the green eye shades, sharp pencils and, today, even sharper spreadsheets. The nuclear execs long have pursued governments as their bulwark against markets, and that has often worked. Today, as Immelt notes, gas has made the market forces so overwhelming, at least in those places such as the U.S. where gas is astonishingly abundant, that even government likely can’t come to the rescue of nuclear power. Could that have something to do with the abject failure of the 2005 Energy Policy Act’s loan guarantee provisions, which have not worked for renewables any better than they have worked for nukes? Indeed, the threat of gas is at least as potentially toxic for many wind and solar projects as it is for nuclear and coal new build. \* In Georgia, the Southern Company is facing what looks like growing problems with its Vogtle project, which aims for two new nuclear units using the unproven but promising Westinghouse AP1000 reactor design. With its federal loan in jeopardy (Southern says it can go ahead without taxpayer funds) and the project running behind schedule and over budget, the Atlanta-based utility now faces lawsuits brought by the reactor vendor and the construction contractor Shaw Group. The amount in dispute, some $29 million, is tiny compared to the multi-billion-dollar price tag for the project. But it may be revealing of ruptures in the deal. Robert Marritz, an energy lawyer and veteran industry observer, publisher of ElectricityPolicy.com, commented that “the very filing of a lawsuit at this stage of the first nuclear plant construction in decades is stunning, reflecting stresses in a relationship that should, one would think, be contained and resolved rather than boiling over into public view.” Indeed, the parties are also engaged in a larger, perhaps nastier, dispute involving $800 million that has not gotten much public exposure. And that’s real money. \* Moving to California, the long-running saga of Edison International’s San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station (SONGS, how’s that for an inept acronym?) continues, with little clarity in sight. The plant has been out of service since January as a result of unexpected and still unexplained tube wear in the plant’s steam generators. According to Bloomberg New Energy Finance, the outage is costing the utility about $1.5 million a day just in lost revenue. The cost to the state in jeopardized reliability hasn’t been calculated, although Edison has started up mothballed gas capacity to fill the supply gap. There is no firm date for restart at the nuclear plant. In the meantime, the California Public Utilities Commission is planning a formal investigation of the outage and Edison’s response, but recently decided to delay that until the utility files a legally-required report with the CPUC November 1. CPUC President Mike Peevey is a former executive with the Los Angeles-based utility.

Natural gas will wreck the industry

WSJ, 3/15/’12

(“Cheap Natural Gas Unplugs U.S. Nuclear-Power Revival”)

What killed the revival wasn't last year's nuclear accident in Japan, nor was it a soft economy that dented demand for electricity. Rather, a shale-gas boom flooded the U.S. market with cheap natural gas, offering utilities a cheaper, less risky alternative to nuclear technology.

"It's killed off new coal and now it's killing off new nuclear," says David Crane, chief executive of NRG Energy Inc., NRG +3.58% a power-generation company based in Princeton, N.J. "Gas has come along at just the right time to upset everything."

Across the country, utilities are turning to natural gas to generate electricity, with 258 plants expected to be built from 2011 through 2015, federal statistics indicate. Not only are gas-fired plants faster to build than reactors, they are much less expensive. The U.S. Energy Information Administration says it costs about $978 per kilowatt of capacity to build and fuel a big gas-fired power plant, compared with $5,339 per kilowatt for a nuclear plant.

Already, the inexpensive natural gas is putting downward pressure on electricity costs for consumers and businesses.

The EIA has forecast that the nation will add 222 gigawatts of generating capacity between 2010 and 2035—equivalent to one-fifth of the current U.S. capacity. The biggest chunk of that addition—58%—will be fired by natural gas, it said, followed by renewable sources, including hydropower, at 31%, then coal at 8% and nuclear power at 4%.

"What utility doesn't want cheap fuel?" says Steve Piper, associate director of energy fundamentals at SNL Financial, a research company. He predicts natural gas will remain the "default fuel" for as long as gas production remains high and prices stay low.

The plan is insufficient to lower costs

Sokolski, executive director – Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, August ‘10

(Henry, “The High and Hidden Costs of Nuclear Power,” Hoover Institution *Policy Review*, No. 162)

To address these concerns, the U.S. nuclear industry has succeeded in getting Congress to implement a growing number of subsidies, including nuclear energy production tax credits and very large federal loan guarantees. Industry estimates indicate that proposed loan guarantees alone would save an American utility at least $13 billion over 30 years in the financing a modern nuclear reactor. Granting these and additional government incentives, though, may not be sufficient. First, in 2003, the Congressional Budget Office (cbo) estimated that the nuclear industry would probably be forced to default on nearly 50 percent of these loans. Second, most recently, Moody’s warned that barring a dramatic positive change in utility-industry balance sheets, the ratings firm would downgrade any power provider that invested in new nuclear reactor construction on the basis that these projects were “bet the farm” gambles. The threat of Moody’s to reduce credit ratings included utilities that might secure federal loan guarantees, which Moody’s described as too “conditional” to be relied on. Meanwhile, the president of America’s largest fleet of nuclear power plants, who now serves as the World Nuclear Association’s vice chairman, publicly cautioned that investing in new nuclear generating capacity would not make sense until both natural gas prices rise and stay above eight dollars per 1,000 cubic feet and carbon prices or taxes rise and stay above $25 a ton. Yet industry officials believe that neither condition, much less both, are likely to be met any time soon. Recent developments suggest their skepticism is warranted. After the latest international conference to control carbon emissions held in December 2009 in Copenhagen, carbon prices in the European carbon market hit a near all-time low. United States’ natural gas prices, meanwhile, driven by reduced demand and massive increases in supplies and newly discovered reserves, have also dropped precipitously. There is good reason to believe that **they are unlikely to rise significantly any time soon**.2

Empirics are overwhelming

Clayton, staff writer – CSM, 2/16/’10

(Mark, “Budget watchdogs see folly in US loan guarantees for nuclear power,” CSM)

Against that backdrop, the Government Accountability Office in 2008 reported that the average risk of default on Department of Energy loan guarantees for all energy projects (including nuclear and other power projects) was about 50 percent. More pointedly, the Congressional Budget Office in 2003 said the default risk for new nuclear reactors would be "very high – well above 50 percent." Even during the heart of the credit boom in 2007, Wall Street's seven biggest investment banks informed the US Department of Energy in a letter that –contrary to the government's expectations – they would require 100 percent federal loan guarantees for any funds they might loan to build new nuclear power plants. That view was echoed last year on Wall Street, when a June report by Moody's Investor Service entitled "New Nuclear Generation: Ratings Pressure Increasing" termed new nuclear plants a "bet the farm" credit risk for the 14 utilities pursuing them. "New Nuclear – The Economics Say No" was the title of a Citigroup report in November that cited surging costs for nuclear power in Britain – despite the British government's recent shift to support it. Citing cost overruns and delays on nuclear power projects in China and Finland, the report said that without loan guarantees from the British government, government-set minimum power prices, and other guarantees, "we see little if any prospect that new nuclear stations will be built in the UK by the private sector." "It speaks volumes that nobody on Wall Street would risk a penny of their own to build a nuclear power plant," says Jerry Taylor, senior fellow at the Cato Institute, a libertarian think thank. "That tells us all we need to know about the wisdom of loaning money to utilities to build nuclear plants."

Nobody has money

Cooper, senior research fellow for economic analysis – Institute for Energy and the Environment @ Vermont Law School, PhD – Yale University, ‘12

(Mark, “Nuclear safety and affordable reactors: Can we have both?” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists Vol. 68, No. 4, p. 61–72)

Has the heralded ‘nuclear renaissance’ finally arrived? In February 2012, for the first time in more than 30 years, the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) issued a license to build two new nuclear reactors. In March, the NRC approved a license for two more new reactors, and utilities have submitted applications for 23 additional reactors. Two of those reactors would be at a brand-new nuclear power plant in Florida’s Levy County, where Progress Energy Florida recently agreed to a settlement that will allow the utility to collect $350 million from customers over the next five years as a down payment. Look more closely at what’s happening in Levy County, however, and you’ll see that **the nuclear industry’s slump is not over yet.** The new Levy County reactors will not start operating for at least another decade, if ever. **It’s all a question of money**: The utility estimates that the reactors will cost between $17 billion and $22 billion, not counting financing charges and cost overruns, which have plagued the nuclear industry. (Progress originally estimated that the reactors would cost $5 billion and would commence operation in 2016.) With the demand for electricity growing at a snail’s pace, and natural gas prices at a fraction of what the utility expected when it filed its application for a new plant in 2008, opposition to the project has mounted, threatening a rerun of the 1970s and 1980s, when the majority of nuclear construction plans were canceled or abandoned.

## 2nc alt causes

Regulatory reform is a prerequisite to subsidy effectiveness

Spencer, research fellow in nuclear energy – Heritage Foundation, and Slobodien, energy policy analyst – Heritage, 2/15/’12

(Jack and Rachael, “Is a Nuclear Renaissance Approaching?” <http://blog.heritage.org/2012/02/15/is-a-nuclear-renaissance-approaching/>)

When the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) voted last week to approve permits to begin construction on two nuclear reactors, many hailed the decision as the start of a nuclear renaissance. Without a doubt, the NRC’s action is noteworthy, because it marks the first time in over three decades that the NRC granted a license to build new reactors. While the NRC’s action should not be downplayed, it’s also important to place this decision in the appropriate context of our nation’s nuclear energy policy. To say this represents a full-scale rebirth of the nuclear industry would be both narrow-sighted and naïve. The Vogle Plant approval does not mitigate the reality that our nation’s nuclear energy policy is in dire need of reform. However, just because the decisions last week alone are not enough to prompt a full-blown nuclear resurgence, that doesn’t mean that one cannot occur. To maximize the full potential of nuclear energy, three fundamental policy issues should be addressed. The U.S. should: Fix how nuclear waste is managed, Develop a more efficient regulatory regime for nuclear energy, and Allow market forces to determine what technologies move forward. Our nation’s current approach to managing nuclear waste is flawed. Private nuclear plants produce waste, but the federal government is responsible for managing it. This removes the incentive for the nuclear utilities to have any interest in how the waste is managed. The nuclear industry is capable of running safe nuclear power plants, is fully capable of managing its own waste, and should have the responsibility to do so. Introducing market forces to waste management will transform the way U.S. handles waste and is critical to securing the long-term success of nuclear power. Next, the government should address the inflexible and often unpredictable regulatory regime that governs the nuclear industry. Rather than providing fair and efficient oversight, current regulations impose unnecessary and harmful barriers that prevent our nation from realizing nuclear industry’s full potential. Additionally, inefficient licensing and rulemaking are responsible for increasing investors’ financial risks and creating a virtual suspension of technological development. The federal government should establish a stable regulatory environment—one that also eliminates burdensome and ineffective regulations—that is conducive to commercial nuclear growth. Unfortunately, nuclear energy advocates have largely turned to federal subsidies to mitigate the financial risks associated with our nation’s outdated regulatory system. And that brings us to the third reform, which is to abandon the flawed notion that the government can subsidize the nuclear industry into success. Subsidies discourage innovation and perpetuate mediocrity. The United States does not need the government to dictate how it produces energy, and government bureaucrats should step aside and allow market forces to determine the future of the nuclear industry. Combined with a regulatory system that allows for technological diversity, this approach would also encourage the introduction of new technologies and services into the market as they are needed. While the approval of construction and operations permits for two reactors was welcomed news, it does not by itself portend a happy ending for nuclear energy. For the rest of America to share with Georgia the opportunities provided by nuclear power, much more must be done.

## No Nonpro Leadership—Short Extn

#### Prefer our evidence—history proves

Cleary 12

Richard Cleary, American Enterprise Institute Research Assistant, 8/13/12, Richard Cleary: Persuading Countries to Forgo Nuclear Fuel-Making, npolicy.org/article.php?aid=1192&tid=30

In recent years, there has been a resurgence of proposals designed to limit the spread of nuclear fuel-making facilities, with the understanding that ostensibly peaceful technology can allow for the production of the fissile material required for a nuclear weapon. With U.S. proposals ranging from the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP) to a revamped, “Gold Standard” bilateral nuclear cooperation agreement, a wider array of tools has been put at the disposal of American policy makers. Prominent members of the international community have become agitated about the prospect of the proliferation of fuel-making technology as well, with numerous proposals of fuel assurances put forward by such disparate figures as Vladimir Putin and Mohamed ElBaradei. But **renewed enthusiasm for nonproliferation begs questions about how novel the instruments proposed are, and**, moreover, **how effective they are likely to be,** particularly for the country historically at the head of nonproliferation efforts, the United States. A review of this historical record suggests that **optimism** about the U.S. ability to dissuade countries from this path **is misplaced**.

This essay considers supply side proposals of fuel assurance, multilateral fuel-making, as well as specific interventions on both the supply and demand sides, consulting particular cases in Iran (1974-1978), West Germany-Brazil (1975-1977), South Korea (1974-1976) and Pakistan (1972-1980) to draw lessons about the effectiveness of U.S. practices under differing circumstances. The record these cases give is mixed, due to two principal causes. The first is the failure of the U.S. to consistently prioritize nonproliferation efforts given Washington’s global and competing interests, interests that tend to be embraced by different factions in the federal government apparatus but whose ultimate arbiter is the president (along with his close advisors). The second is the tendency of decisions about nuclear fuel-making by the state in question to be influenced more by fundamental trends or factors than diplomatic maneuvering from Washington; diplomacy is most effective when it has the political, economic and military backing to implicate these issues. The most important factor in U.S. efforts has tended to be the bilateral relationship between Washington and the country at hand. Decision-makers who consider their country’s relationship with the U.S. to be strategically vital—and believe that fuel-making would threaten this relationship—are most likely to forgo enrichment and reprocessing (ENR) technology. This calculus can be informed by a range of dynamics, some beyond U.S. control, such as security concerns, issues of prestige, and commercial and industrial interests. Domestic politics and public opinion, both in the United States and in the country considering fuel-making, can be influential.

One of the fundamental tensions of American nonproliferation efforts lies with the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), the international legal framework of reference in nonproliferation matters. The prevailing interpretation of the NPT centers on what has been referred to as the “fundamental bargain”: in exchange for nuclear-weapons states’ movement toward disarmament and their sharing of technology and expertise for peaceful nuclear energy, nonnuclear weapons states will not pursue the bomb.1

One portion of the NPT, in particular, has borne on U.S. efforts to persuade countries not to pursue nuclear fuel-making technology: Article IV. Here, the NPT enshrines the “inalienable right…to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes,” and pledges signatories to “undertake to facilitate…the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.”2 Traditionally, the U.S. has elected for an ambiguous middle ground, not denying an Article IV “inalienable” right to fuel-making, but not acknowledging it either.3 While U.S. interpretations of the NPT have not, as a practical matter, stemmed its attempts to convince countries to eschew nuclear fuel-making technology, the NPT’s bargain has shaped certain stances, particularly supply side proposals such as fuel assurances.

The application of U.S. national power, on both the supply and demand sides of nuclear fuel-making, can play a role in convincing countries of the benefits of their relationship with Washington and the costs to be incurred if this relationship were fractured. The adroit use of “sticks” and “carrots” can withhold or provide incentives for cooperation, convincing countries considering ENR that the risks of doing so outweigh the benefits. The **case studies** examined here **suggest** that if the United States is to give the impression that a bilateral relationship rests in the balance, Washington may have to undertake risks of its own, perhaps compromising other policy objects for the sake of nonproliferation. **When** the **circumstances** have **called for Washington to put nonproliferation goals above others, policy makers** have often **failed to do so.**

#### Obama won’t push nonproliferation leverage

Lewis 12

Jeffrey Lewis, director of the East Asia Nonproliferation Program at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation, 8/1/12, It's Not as Easy as 1-2-3, www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/08/01/it\_s\_not\_as\_easy\_as\_1\_2\_3?page=full

That's why others in the nonproliferation community have argued that the United States should use its desirability as a partner in nuclear cooperation as leverage. States are unlikely to forgo ENR programs simply because the United States or others offer cheap alternatives. A little muscle is called for - and circumstances have offered leverage: With more than a dozen new agreements to be negotiated, the Obama administration has an opportunity to write into many agreements a new, stronger nonproliferation standard.

So far, however, **the administration has been reluctant to put the squeeze on** potential **partners**. Many Obama officials took the view outlined by Poneman in his article - that asking states to renounce ENR could make the situation worse. (It is important to note that I am not aware of Poneman's view inside the interagency deliberations.) So the administration has largely avoided pressuring states to renounce enrichment and reprocessing capabilities. Despite early talk of the "gold standard," this January the administration announced it would take what officials described as a case-by-case approach. In bureaucratic terms, **this amounts to** having **no standard at all**. **It is hard to imagine a less restrictive policy**. I suppose the administration could announce it would not even try. As it is, they will try - but not very hard.

#### Makes nonproliferation ineffective

Cleary 12

Richard Cleary, American Enterprise Institute Research Assistant, 8/13/12, Richard Cleary: Persuading Countries to Forgo Nuclear Fuel-Making, npolicy.org/article.php?aid=1192&tid=30

In recent years, a new nonproliferation instrument has appeared: a restructured 123 nuclear cooperation agreement, developed in the course of negotiations with the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and signed in 2009. This agreement, unlike previous bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements, offers a model for demand side nonproliferation, with the UAE vowing to forgo all enrichment and reprocessing technology on its own soil. It goes far beyond, for example, the “veto” on reprocessing of U.S.-origin spent fuel broached in the negotiations with the Shah. **This “Gold Standard” agreement**, much hailed at first, particularly in contrast to Iran’s enrichment activities, **has begun to lose its luster as, once again, competing priorities marginalize nonproliferation**. In January 2012, the Obama Administration announced that a “case by case” approach would be taken to the application of the Gold Standard. Countries such as Vietnam, where the U.S. holds out hope for a grander partnership aimed at countering China, **may not be held to the UAE’s standard**.100 Today, as in the 1970s with the Symington and Glenn Amendments, Congress seems most concerned about the prospect of proliferation of ENR technology.

The UAE case is a striking reminder of the lasting **challenge facing** American **nonproliferation** efforts. As a global power with ranging interests, governed by a political system where dissenting factions in Congress, the White House, and bureaucratic organs can influence policy in a number of ways, and operating in an international system with its own constraints on U.S. power, **the U**nited **S**tates **has struggled to marshal its strength toward persuading countries to forgo nuclear fuel-making**. While there is no guarantee that the decisive and steadfast application of sticks and carrots in the cases above would have changed the outcomes—it may have brought unintended consequences of its own—a commitment to doing so would have improved the chance of persuading countries to eschew fuel-making.

## No Solvency Extn

#### US nuclear leadership is irrelevant—countries won’t buy US if its constraining

Lewis 12

Jeffrey Lewis, director of the East Asia Nonproliferation Program at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation, 8/1/12, It's Not as Easy as 1-2-3, www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/08/01/it\_s\_not\_as\_easy\_as\_1\_2\_3?page=full

Creating market incentives to discourage the spread of enrichment and reprocessing seems like a reasonable thing to do - **except that most states make nuclear decisions on something other than a cost basis**. Nuclear power enthusiasts have been no strangers to wishful thinking, starting with claims that nuclear energy would be "too cheap to meter." Government decisions about nuclear power tend to **prioritize** concerns about **sovereignty** and keeping technological pace with neighbors. It is not hard to see national nuclear programs as something akin to national airlines - money-losing prestige projects that barely take market forces into account. Often, aspiring nuclear states look to countries like the United States and Japan as models. If such countries invest heavily in fuel-cycle services, developing states might **try to copy** them **rather than** simply **become** their **customers**.

## AT: Pressure / Cred Overwhelms\*\*\*

#### Cred fails—US can’t dictate nonprolif rules within nuclear energy

McGoldrick 10

Fred McGoldrick, CSIS, spent 30 years at the U.S. State and Energy Departments and at the U.S. mission to the IAEA, negotiated peaceful nuclear cooperation agreements with a number of countries and helped shape the policy of the United States to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, 11/30/10, The U.S.-UAE Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation Agreement: A Gold Standard or Fool’s Gold?, http://csis.org/files/publication/101130\_McGoldrick\_USUAENuclear.pdf

In sum, the United States is facing an uphill battle to compete in the international nuclear market and **cannot dictate nonproliferation conditions** that others will find unacceptable. **Nations** embarking on new nuclear programs **do not need to rely on the U**nited **S**tates **for their nuclear fuel**, equipment, components, **or technology**. **They have alternatives and lots of them**, as other states with nuclear programs have steadily built up their nuclear export capacities, which in some cases are state run or state supported.

## 2NC Prolif Slow

#### No widespread proliferation

Hymans 12

Jacques Hymans, USC Associate Professor of IR, 4/16/12, North Korea's Lessons for (Not) Building an Atomic Bomb, www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/137408/jacques-e-c-hymans/north-koreas-lessons-for-not-building-an-atomic-bomb?page=show

Washington's miscalculation is not just a product of the difficulties of seeing inside the Hermit Kingdom. It is also a result of the broader tendency to overestimate the pace of global proliferation. For decades, Very Serious People have predicted that strategic weapons are about to spread to every corner of the earth. **Such warnings have routinely proved wrong** - for instance, the intelligence assessments that led to the 2003 invasion of Iraq - but they continue to be issued. In reality, despite the diffusion of the relevant technology and the knowledge for building nuclear weapons, the world has been experiencing a great proliferation slowdown. Nuclear weapons programs around the world are taking much longer to get off the ground - and their failure rate is much higher - than they did during the first 25 years of the nuclear age.

As I explain in my article "Botching the Bomb" in the upcoming issue of Foreign Affairs, the key reason for the great proliferation slowdown is the absence of strong cultures of scientific professionalism in most of the recent crop of would-be nuclear states, which in turn is a consequence of their poorly built political institutions. In such dysfunctional states, the quality of technical workmanship is low, there is little coordination across different technical teams, and technical mistakes lead not to productive learning but instead to finger-pointing and recrimination. **These problems are debilitating**, and **they cannot be fixed** simply by bringing in more imported parts through illicit supply networks. In short, as a struggling proliferator, North Korea has a lot of company.

## China

## 2nc – coop now

#### DoE and China created an MOU to develop new reactors after their internal link evidence was written

#### Tons of other forums for cooperation

John R. Lyman, Atlantic Council, 2009, United States-China Cooperation on nuclear power, http://www.acus.org/files/publication\_pdfs/65/AtlanticCouncil-USChinaNuclearPower.pdf

The U.S. and China signed a Bilateral Civil Nuclear Energy Cooperative Action Plan on September 15, 2007. DOE has similar agreements with Russia, Japan, Australia, and pending signature, France. The organizational structure of the U.S.-China Bilateral activity is shown in Figure 6.

This bilateral activity is up and running with a structure approved by both governments and a plan for future progress. The first meeting under the auspices of the U.S./China Civil Nuclear Energy Cooperation Action Plan focused on advanced fuel cycle technologies, namely fast reactor technology, fuels and separations technologies, and advanced safeguards and physical protection This meeting was held at was held at Argonne National Laboratory (ANL) in), Chicago, Illinois on April 23, 2008. Another meeting of the fuel cycle technology-working group is scheduled to take place the week of May 18th in Beijing, China. Assuming significant progress is made at the May working group, then a formal U.S./China, a Steering Committee meeting could take place either in the summer or fall of 2009. The purpose of this meeting would be to approve of the R&D plan developed in the May meeting, and thereby initiate Phase II of the Action Plan. While it is a somewhat formal process, DOE reports that it is working very well as all parties know what to expect and what the process will produce.

3.4.2 International Cooperation Activities

The U.S. spearheaded the establishment of the Generation IV International Forum (GIF) in July 2001 with nine charter countries, Argentina, Brazil, Canada, France, Japan, South Korea, South Africa, the United Kingdom, and the U.S. Switzerland joined in 2002, EURATOM in 2003, and China and Russia in 2006.

The GIF aims to introduce the Gen IV technologies on a wide scale by 2030. The broad program goals feature:

• Sustainability, promoted by increasing the availability of nuclear fuel and minimizing the waste stream;

• Safety and reliability, with a system that would have a low likelihood and degree of reactor core damage, and a facility that would not need offsite emergency response; Economical system, with life cycle cost advantages over other energy sources and an acceptable level of financial risk; and,

• Proliferation resistance, with little attractiveness as a route for weapons-useable materials and improved physical protection attributes to guard against potential terrorist acts.

Table 6 outlines the six major technologies currently being investigated by the GIF, a summary of their attributes, and the status of their development. Over 100 international experts participated in selecting these technologies.

A Framework Agreement, signed by the GIF partner governments, among other things, specifies R&D projects to be undertaken, assigns the responsible government entities responsible for work, affords intellectual property protection, and allows for multilateral contracts to be given for the R&D work. The focus is on R&D but demonstration plants could conceivably be built under the framework.

China is working on the VHTR projects in the areas of materials testing and components and high performance turbines. China’s fast reactor R&D program compliments the DOE’s AFCI activities, and those of the GIF, and will provide fertile ground for further cooperation.

The U.S. and China also participate in the U.S.-sponsored Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP). This international collaboration between 25 countries14 focuses on how to foster the creation of civilian nuclear power programs in developing countries and to devise an international nuclear fuel supply framework. The GNEP Working Group, under the GNEP Steering Group, charged with developing “Reliable Fuel Services” met in France in March 2009. According to a statement by DOE deputy press secretary Jen Stutsman to Nuclear Engineering, “The Department [DOE] has already decided not to continue the domestic GNEP program of the last Administration. The long-term fuel cycle research and development program will continue, but not the near-term deployment of recycling facilities or fast reactors.”15 DOE’s fuel cycle research and development program will continue under the name “Advanced Fuel Cycle Initiative” (AFCI).

Both the U.S. and China participate in the International Project on Innovative Nuclear Reactors and Fuel Cycles (INPRO), which was established in 2001 by the IAEA General Conference. Its objectives are to ensure that nuclear energy is available to contribute, in a sustainable manner, to meeting the energy needs of the 21st century and bring together technology holders and users so that they can consider jointly the international and national actions required for achieving desired innovations in nuclear reactors and fuel cycles. It is basically a forum for discussion for experts and policy makers from industrialized and developing countries on all aspects of nuclear energy planning as well as on the development and deployment of innovative nuclear energy systems.

In March 2009 China joined the Global Actinide Cycle International Demonstration (GACID)16 which was formed by France, Japan, South Korea and the U.S. This project, a major GIF activity, is investigating the use of actinide-laden fuel assemblies in fast reactors as part of the sodium- cooled fast reactor program. The work is being undertaken by France’s Atomic Energy Commission, Japan’s Atomic Energy Agency, and the U.S. DOE. The first stage will lead to demonstration fuel containing minor actinides being used in Japan’s Monju reactor.

#### Joint development last year – it included DoE funding

Mark Halper, Smart Planet, 7/3/12, Westinghouse enters U.S.-China nuclear collaboration, www.smartplanet.com/blog/intelligent-energy/westinghouse-enters-us-china-nuclear-collaboration/17252

Pittsburgh-based Westinghouse Electric Co. is playing a supporting role in the U.S. Department of Energy’s and China’s collaborative development of an alternative and potentially safer nuclear reactor - a project for which DOE has funded three U.S. universities, SmartPlanet has learned.

As I reported last week, DOE and the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS) have been quietly working together on a reactor design that uses a molten salt coolant auguring safer, more efficient and lower cost reactors that operate at higher temperatures than conventional water-cooled reactors.

The Chinese also intend to use liquid thorium molten salt fuel in a molten salt cooled reactor. Some experts believe that the combination of a liquid thorium fuel and a molten salt-coolant would provide a reactor that is much more efficient than today’s reactors, and that cannot melt down. Supporters claim that thorium molten salt reactors would yield waste that lasts for only hundreds of years instead of uranium’s tens of thousands, and from which it is far more difficult to build a bomb.

Acting Westinghouse CEO Shigenori Shiga.

The U.S. developed a thorium molten salt reactor in the 1960s at Oak Ridge National Laboratory, but abandoned it in favor of more weapons-prone uranium reactors during the Cold War, a story which author Richard Martin tells vividly in his new book, SuperFuel.

Following my report last week based on a purportedly leaked Chinese Academy of Sciences presentation, a DOE spokeswoman confirmed for me that DOE signed an agreement with CAS last December for “cooperation in nuclear energy sciences and technologies.”

Pete Lyons, assistant DOE secretary for nuclear energy, said in an email sent by the spokesperson that,

 “These collaborations will strengthen cooperation between the U.S. and China around next generation nuclear technology, helping to advance mutually beneficial technological advancements and grow civilian nuclear power as a safe, reliable and clean source of energy for both countries.”

#### Solves the adv—its mutually beneficial

John R. Lyman, Atlantic Council, 2009, United States-China Cooperation on nuclear power, http://www.acus.org/files/publication\_pdfs/65/AtlanticCouncil-USChinaNuclearPower.pdf

The U.S. NRC should continue to aid China’s National Nuclear Safety Administration (NNSA) in the development of its regulatory system and training of regulators. A follow-on dialogue should focus on obtaining more information as to how China plans to ramp up its regulatory structure to meet the demands of a rapid deployment of commercial nuclear power across the spectrum of reactors it is currently planning.

7 . As the Chinese nuclear power industry matures, there will be opportunities for Chinese companies to provide services such as uprating, refueling, maintenance

and outage control services. Efforts to establish such cooperation should be initiated in the near term.

8 . To improve the commercial nuclear plant supply chain, China should consider establishing a qualified supplier list. In the process, Chinese companies fabricating components need better training with regard to the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) standards code.

9 . Commercial entities in both the U.S. and China can take advantage of their competitive edges for mutual benefit. The U.S. has technical competitive edges and China has geographic edges vis-à-vis the developing market for nuclear power. U.S. and Chinese companies can jointly exploit these competitive edges to develop the South East Asian markets.

#### Market ties are strong – outweighs one demo

John R. Lyman, Atlantic Council, 2009, United States-China Cooperation on nuclear power, http://www.acus.org/files/publication\_pdfs/65/AtlanticCouncil-USChinaNuclearPower.pdf

Cooperation between the U.S. and China will be mutually beneficial. It is to the U.S.’s benefit that China designs and operates a safe nuclear power program. China is a significant market for the U.S. nuclear industry and provides an opportunity to maintain its manufacturing capabilities until its first new U.S. orders get underway.

U.S. industry presence in China also increases relationships and communications thus improving U.S. security. The unprecedented transfer of nuclear technology to the Chinese will, in turn, help them develop clean sources of electricity sorely needed to address the fast growing needs of its economy and public. As Chinese capabilities grow, the nuclear supply chain is reinforced, supporting further opportunities for U.S. companies to expand reactor sales abroad. American and Chinese companies together can take advantage of their mutual competitive edges in technology and geography to expand into new markets.

United States-China Cooperation on Nuclear Power: An Opportunity for Fostering Sustainable Energy Security

Cooperation and leadership are key and complimentary components in the U.S.’s and China’s efforts to ensure nuclear power’s contribution to meeting energy demand. Cooperation on technology development, human resources, security and safety will form the basis for their leadership on the world stage. Their combined actions will matter greatly in providing a quality environment with adequate energy supplies. The world is watching!

The Chinese participants signaled their desire to improve both government-to-government cooperation and commercial sector ties. It appears that the U.S. government is equally interested in working with China to tackle the overarching challenges of developing a safe and secure commercial nuclear fuel cycle. By supporting and participating in this Dialogue, U.S. industry and government participants have demonstrated their commitment to dealing with the challenges to realize the burgeoning nuclear trade between the two countries.

## 2nc no war

#### Economic incentives

Rachman, chief foreign affairs commentator – Financial Times, ‘11

(Gideon, “Think Again: American Decline,” *Foreign Policy*, Jan/Feb)

Yet even if you factor in considerable future economic and political turbulence, it would be a big mistake to assume that the Chinese challenge to U.S. power will simply disappear. Once countries get the hang of economic growth, it takes a great deal to throw them off course. The analogy to the rise of Germany from the mid-19th century onward is instructive. Germany went through two catastrophic military defeats, hyperinflation, the Great Depression, the collapse of democracy, and the destruction of its major cities and infrastructure by Allied bombs. And yet by the end of the 1950s, West Germany was once again one of the world's leading economies, albeit shorn of its imperial ambitions.

In a nuclear age, China is unlikely to get sucked into a world war, so it will not face turbulence and disorder on remotely the scale Germany did in the 20th century. And whatever economic and political difficulties it does experience will not be enough to stop the country's rise to great-power status. Sheer size and economic momentum mean that the Chinese juggernaut will keep rolling forward, no matter what obstacles lie in its path.

## 2nc no escalation

#### No nuclear escalation and outside powers will stay out

Roger **Cliff,** Ph.D. in international relations, Princeton, M.A. in history (Chinese studies), University of California, San Diego, Assistant for Strategy Development, Office of the Secretary of Defense, and David A. **Shlapak**, Ph.D., senior international policy analyst, RAND Project Air Force Report, 200**7**

This situation would occur if China attempted to use force to achieve unification, the United States intervened, and China’s efforts were defeated, but Beijing refused to accept Taiwan’s independence.10 Analysis at RAND has found that a conflict between the United States and China over Taiwan would likely be confined to the use of conventional weapons, even though both the United States and China possess nuclear weapons, and that it would not likely escalate into a broader war between the United States and China. That is, the war would be contained in the area around Taiwan; the main combatants would probably be limited to the United States, China, and Japan; and active hostilities would probably end after a relatively short time. Nonetheless, such a war would probably result in a bitter relationship between the United States and China, comparable in some ways to that between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. China might well accelerate the buildup of its military capabilities with an eye toward waging a second, this time successful, campaign to claim Taiwan. This military competition would likely also be accompanied by a broader deterioration in Sino-U.S. relations, with mutual trade and investment falling dramatically or even ceasing, and each country demanding that its allies not cooperate with its rival. Countries in Asia might find themselves under pressure to choose between good relations with the United States and good relations with China. Nonetheless, even under these circumstances, the relationship between the United States and China after an inconclusive war over Taiwan would have important differences from the one between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Unlike the Soviet Union, China is closely integrated into the world economy. With the exception of Japan, most countries in Asia would likely regard the importance of maintaining good relations with Beijing as outweighing any concerns about China having used force against Taiwan. They would resist U.S. pressure to choose between Washington and Beijing, preferring to maintain good relations with both. This logic would apply even more strongly to countries outside the region, which would be even less concerned about China’s use of force.

## 1NC Relations

#### Relations solve nothing – No coop

**Blumenthal 11** (Dan, Resident fellow at AEI, Current commissioner and former vice chairman of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, where he directs efforts to monitor, investigate, and provide recommendations on the national security implications of the economic relationship between the two countries. Previously, he was senior director for China, Taiwan, and Mongolia in the Secretary of Defense's Office of International Security Affairs and practiced law in New York prior to his government service. At AEI, in addition to his work on the national security implications of U.S.-Sino relations, he coordinates the Tocqueville on China project, which examines the underlying civic culture of post-Mao China. Mr. Blumenthal also contributes to AEI's Asian Outlook series and is a research associate with the National Asia Research Program. 10/3/2011, “The top ten unicorns of China policy”, http://www.aei.org/article/foreign-and-defense-policy/regional/asia/the-top-ten-unicorns-of-china-policy/)

9) We need China's help to solve global problems. This is further down on my list because it is not really a fantastical unicorn. It is true. What is a fantasy is that China will be helpful. We do need China to disarm North Korea. They do not want to, and North Korea is now a nuclear power. The same may soon be true with Iran. The best we can get in our diplomacy with China is to stop Beijing from being less helpful. It is a fact that the global problems would be easier to manage with Chinese help. However, China actually contributing to global order is a unicorn.

# 1NR

## india

US-Indian relations low but will never collapse

**Padukone 12** (Neil Padukone is the Felow for geopolitics at the Takshashila Institution, 6/19/2012, "Natural Allies?", pragati.nationalinterest.in/2012/06/natural-allies/)

In the late 1990s, the United States and India embarked on a partnership based largely on three strategic issues: markets, counter-terrorism, and balancing China. With the opening of India’s economy in 1991, the United States saw India’s billion-strong population as a massive market for its businesses. In the wake of 9/11, Washington came to see India’s travails against Islamist militants in Kashmir and Afghanistan through the lens of its War on Terror and increased counter-terrorism cooperation with New Delhi. And as India’s and China’s strategic spaces began to overlap, managing China’s rise became a common concern for both New Delhi and Washington. With that in mind, the United States and India reversed decades of enmity and, through the 2006 nuclear deal, embarked upon a symbolic commitment to what heads of state of both countries have called a “natural alliance.” Yet with all the fanfare- particularly after U.S. President Barack Obama voiced his support for a permanent Indian seat on the UN Security Council in his 2010 Lok Sabha speech- bilateral ties have recently been marked by considerable drift: India has not fallen in line on the issue of Iran, Washington is only slowly coming around on Pakistani militancy, the countries’ UN voting records do not mesh, and trade disagreements abound. Questions have been raised over why U.S.-India relations have cooled, or whether they were over hyped in the first place. The U.S. Department of Defense’s “strategic pivot” toward Asia is one way to shore up relations and realign the Indo-U.S. partnership. India’s geostrategic location at the centre of the Indian Ocean- along with its naval expansion toward the southern Indian Ocean and its Port Blair naval base at the Andaman Islands- enable New Delhi to manage China’s presence in the region. Indeed, India and America’s navies have been more coordinated than any other bureaucracy since 2000. But the implications of this shared Beijing-centric orientation will only come about in the medium-term. One dimension of these ties, the sale of defence technologies, is another place where India has not yet delivered: the recent Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft (MMRCA) competition failed to award contracts to American companies. And in the middle of a global recession in which all countries are hunkering down, and domestic inflation and unemployment- not to mention concerns over doing business in India, such as retroactive taxation and tax avoidance measures- have grown, economic reforms that would further open India’s markets have slowed. U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s recent visit to Kolkata was largely an effort to encourage India to increase the speed of its market liberalisation, particularly in the retail sector. This may be a prospect for the future, but is doubtful today given India’s economic slowdown and the attendant drop in employment. Yet perhaps the main reason for this strategic drift is that America’s key concern in South Asia these days is Afghanistan. President Obama delivered on his campaign promise to refocus efforts on the war in that country, and from 2009, his administration’s “AfPak” strategy took a regional perspective that originally sought to bring India into the equation. The thinking behind this, as Amitai Etzioni writes, is that “for Pakistanis, conflict (with India) poses an ominous existential challenge that drives their behaviour on all things,” including “their approach to the West and the war in Afghanistan… If the India-Pakistan confrontation could be settled, chances for progress on other fronts would be greatly enhanced.” The implication was that Washington ought to hyphenate India and Pakistan, to see the two as part of the same regional tussle, and try to settle the Kashmir dispute in order to make progress in Afghanistan. This was something New Delhi vehemently opposed and in fact, it sought de-hyphenation from Pakistan – engagement with New Delhi and Islamabad on separate and unconnected tracks. So when the office of the late US Special Adviser on Pakistan and Afghanistan Richard Holbrooke sought to include India and Kashmir in its purview, New Delhi successfully lobbied against it. This effort served one of India’s aims, insofar as it keeps Kashmir out of America’s area of direct intervention. Yet it also takes India, its assets, and its clout out of the broader Afghan resolution. Among these assets is the Indian-constructed Chabahar Road that connects Iran’s eastern Chabahar Port on the Gulf of Oman to western Afghanistan. The road ends Pakistan’s monopoly on seaborne trade to Afghanistan, which has long allowed Islamabad’s pernicious dominance of Kabul’s economic and political life. In light of America’s confrontation with Iran and efforts to sanction the latter’s energy sector, however, Washington opposes India’s use of Chabahar, particularly to import Iranian oil and natural gas. Indeed another goal of Secretary Clinton’s visit was to try to shore up India’s support for sanctions against Iran- to which end India is reducing its dependence on Iranian energy as it awaits an exemption on sanctions from the US State Department. But when New Delhi recently used its Chabahar road to send 100,000 tons of wheat to Kabul, its full potential vis-à-vis Afghanistan became evident. And this food aid was on top of India’s additional commitments to Afghanistan: constructing the Zaranj-Delaram highway in western Afghanistan that connects Chabahar to the Afghan ring road, the development of the Ayni Air base in Tajikistan (originally designed to treat wounded Afghan soldiers), building Afghanistan’s parliament building, exploring the Hajigak iron mine, and even commitments to train the Afghan National Police and Army- all of which amount to pledges of over $1 billion since 2001. Washington has been wary of encouraging India’s presence in Afghanistan citing Islamabad’s fear of encirclement. But, even without American attention, a refutation of Pakistan’s “India Threat” narrative is already underway. In order to remain focused on strategic horizons beyond South Asia, India is reorienting its defence apparatus away from Pakistan and towards China and the southern Indian Ocean; even the Ayni Base and Chabahar Road can be seen as elements of this strategic shift beyond the subcontinent. Together with Pakistan’s focus on the Durand Line and events within its own borders, political breathing space between Islamabad and New Delhi has opened up. India-Pakistan talks have already produced a number of important breakthroughs that portend better bilateral days to come: the granting of Most-Favoured Nation status, enhanced trade measures, as well as discussions on the specific parameters of a Kashmir peace based on economic integration. Specifically regarding the Indo-Pak dynamic in Afghanistan, things are less zero-sum than they appear. Important as the Chabahar route is, the combination of road, sea, and even rail links still comes with massive transport costs for India-Afghanistan trade. As S Verma, chairman of Steel Authority of India and the head of a consortium of Indian industries engaged in Afghanistan’s Hajigak iron mine, put it, “over the longer term,” transporting Afghan minerals over Pakistani territory “will be a productive investment. Not just for us, but others in the region including Pakistan. There are license fees, logistics, and so forth.” Meanwhile, Kaustav Chakrabarti of the Observer Research Foundation has suggested “deploying joint Indo-Pak nation building teams” in Afghanistan that include advisors, military trainers, bureaucrats, developments experts, medical crews and NGOs. These teams would “provide additional resources, bridge political polarities, foster cooperation between India and Pakistan and devise means to verify each other’s role, and ultimately, present a long-term mechanism,” guaranteed by India and Pakistan’s geographic proximity, “to ensure Afghanistan’s neutrality.” He cites as a precedent the collaboration between Indian and Pakistani armed forces in “UN peacekeeping missions in hot spots like Somalia.” Full realisation of any Indo-Pak promise will require more space, and time, between the two countries. The interim period, meanwhile, may indeed take a cooling period between the United States and India, who are unlikely to become allies in the fullest sense due to differing tactical approaches. But the strategic fundamentals of the Indo-American rapport- balancing China, expanding trade, and stabilising South Asia- remain intact.

#### No war – deterrence checks escalation

Ganguly, 8

[Sumit Ganguly is a professor of political science and holds the Rabindranath Tagore Chair at Indiana University, Bloomington. “Nuclear Stability in South Asia,” International Security, Vol. 33, No. 2 (Fall 2008), pp. 45–70]

As the outcomes of the 1999 and 2001–02 crises show, nuclear deterrence is robust in South Asia. Both crises were contained at levels considerably short of full-scale war. That said, as Paul Kapur has argued, Pakistan’s acquisition of a nuclear weapons capability may well have emboldened its leadership, secure in the belief that India had no good options to respond. India, in turn, has been grappling with an effort to forge a new military doctrine and strategy to enable it to respond to Pakistani needling while containing the possibilities of conflict escalation, especially to the nuclear level.78 Whether Indian military planners can fashion such a calibrated strategy to cope with Pakistani probes remains an open question. This article’s analysis of the 1999 and 2001–02 crises does suggest, however, that nuclear deterrence in South Asia is far from parlous, contrary to what the critics have suggested. Three specific forms of evidence can be adduced to argue the case for the strength of nuclear deterrence. First, there is a serious problem of conflation in the arguments of both Hoyt and Kapur. Undeniably, Pakistan’s willingness to provoke India has increased commensurate with its steady acquisition of a nuclear arsenal. This period from the late 1980s to the late 1990s, however, also coincided with two parallel developments that equipped Pakistan with the motives, opportunities, and means to meddle in India’s internal affairs—particularly in Jammu and Kashmir. The most important change that occurred was the end of the conflict with the Soviet Union, which freed up military resources for use in a new jihad in Kashmir. This jihad, in turn, was made possible by the emergence of an indigenous uprising within the state as a result of Indian political malfeasance.79 Once the jihadis were organized, trained, armed, and unleashed, it is far from clear whether Pakistan could control the behavior and actions of every resulting jihadist organization.80 Consequently, although the number of attacks on India did multiply during the 1990s, it is difficult to establish a firm causal connection between the growth of Pakistani boldness and its gradual acquisition of a full-fledged nuclear weapons capability.

Second, India did respond with considerable force once its military planners realized the full scope and extent of the intrusions across the Line of Control. Despite the vigor of this response, India did exhibit restraint. For example, Indian pilots were under strict instructions not to cross the Line of Control in pursuit of their bombing objectives.81 They adhered to these guidelines even though they left them more vulnerable to Pakistani ground ªre.82 The Indian military exercised such restraint to avoid provoking Pakistani fears of a wider attack into Pakistan-controlled Kashmir and then into Pakistan itself. Indian restraint was also evident at another level. During the last war in Kashmir in 1965, within a week of its onset, the Indian Army horizontally escalated with an attack into Pakistani Punjab. In fact, in the Punjab, Indian forces successfully breached the international border and reached the outskirts of the regional capital, Lahore. The Indian military resorted to this strategy under conditions that were not especially propitious for the country. Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, India’s first prime minister, had died in late 1964. His successor, Lal Bahadur Shastri, was a relatively unknown politician of uncertain stature and standing, and the Indian military was still recovering from the trauma of the 1962 border war with the People’s Republic of China.83 Finally, because of its role in the Cold War, the Pakistani military was armed with more sophisticated, U.S.-supplied weaponry, including the F-86 Sabre and the F-104 Starfighter aircraft. India, on the other hand, had few supersonic aircraft in its inventory, barring a small number of Soviet-supplied MiG-21s and the indigenously built HF-24.84 Furthermore, the Indian military remained concerned that China might open a second front along the Himalayan border. Such concerns were not entirely chimerical, because a Sino-Pakistani entente was under way. Despite these limitations, the Indian political leadership responded to Pakistani aggression with vigor and granted the Indian military the necessary authority to expand the scope of the war. In marked contrast to the politico-military context of 1965, in 1999 India had a self-confident (if belligerent) political leadership and a substantially more powerful military apparatus. Moreover, the country had overcome most of its Nehruvian inhibitions about the use of force to resolve disputes.85 Furthermore, unlike in 1965, India had at least two reserve strike corps in the Punjab in a state of military readiness and poised to attack across the border if given the political nod.86 Despite these significant differences and advantages, the Indian political leadership chose to scrupulously limit the scope of the conflict to the Kargil region. As K. Subrahmanyam, a prominent Indian defense analyst and political commentator, wrote in 1993:.

The awareness on both sides of a nuclear capability that can enable either country to assemble nuclear weapons at short notice induces mutual caution. This caution is already evident on the part of India. In 1965, when Pakistan carried out its “Operation Gibraltar” and sent in infiltrators, India sent its army across the cease-fire line to destroy the assembly points of the infiltrators. That escalated into a full-scale war. In 1990, when Pakistan once again carried out a massive infiltration of terrorists trained in Pakistan, India tried to deal with the problem on Indian territory and did not send its army into Pakistan-occupied Kashmir.87

## da

#### Fiscal cliff collapse energy funding

The Atlantic, Editors, 5/7/12, Who Will Save Clean Energy?, www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2012/05/who-will-save-clean-energy/256816/

The "fiscal cliff" refers to the double-whammy the U.S. could face in early 2013, when trillions in tax hikes and domestic cuts are scheduled to kick in. But clean energy is facing its own fiscal cliff, which could provide an even sharper drop.

Annual federal clean tech spending is already down $10 billion between 2009 and 2011, as the Recovery Act has wound down. Now it's on pace to fall by more than 50% year-over-year in 2012, and decline yet again in 2013, and again in 2014. At a time when China is investing nearly $1 trillion in clean tech projects, Washington is waving the white flag on green. After renewable electricity, clean tech spending for other energy sources will slow to a trickle.

#### Sequestration is a bigger and faster internal link to every regional war and terror

Skelton, partner with Husch Blackwell and former Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, 9/20/2012

(“Sequestration means cuts we can’t afford,” Roll Call, Lexis)

**Sequestration will** also **erode America's military superiority over the next decade by cutting even the most essential defense programs**. Any military commander will tell you that our ability to dominate the battlefield is not only dependent on critical thinking but is fueled by superior aircraft, ships, weapons and intelligence. Sequestration would cripple each of these categories, virtually interfere with professional military education at our war colleges, ending the modernization of fighter jets, combat ships, helicopters, ground vehicles, drone aircraft and satellite technologies.

Without a thorough study of the art of war and first-rate equipment, **the U.S. military will be far less able to deter gathering conflicts or quickly resolve those conflicts we are unable to avoid**. The "Powell Doctrine" of risking our troops only when backed up by overwhelming force and a clear path to decisive victory could be at risk.

With our unique portfolio of global responsibilities, **we could find it difficult to** simultaneously **pursue terrorists**, **contain Iran and North Korea**, **counter a rising China and deal with exploding hot spots such as Syria** today.

Those that say we can risk skipping one or two generations of military development are poor students of military history. America rose from a young, regional power to a formidable military force over the course of World War I alone. And Germany rose from the ashes of that war to threaten all of Europe in less than two decades.

Today, technology has accelerated the pace of change, and **our adversaries are** certainly **not sitting on their hands. Russia and China** are both building sixth-generation stealth fighters, while Iran and North Korea race to develop nuclear intercontinental ballistic missiles. **The rise of cyber weapons puts America's highly networked economy and society at particular risk**. We can choose to delay our defenses against these developing threats, but the threats themselves won't wait.

## uq

#### Deal failure causes total collapse

Marilyn Geewak, NPR, 9/20/12, 'Fiscal Cliff' Scenarios Leave Economists On Edge, www.npr.org/2012/09/20/161442506/fiscal-cliff-scenarios-leave-economists-on-edge

Economists — backed by the White House budget office, the Congressional Budget Office and Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke — warn that **the country could fall into a deep recession if a fiscal cliff isn't averted**.

Even if Congress has left itself enough time to swerve away from a sharp-drop cliff in December, it may be pushing the country toward a fiscal ledge, which is scary too.

"**This is** probably **the greatest fiscal danger facing the economy**, simply because most voters and investors don't recognize its implications," J.P. Morgan Funds Global Chief Strategist David Kelly wrote in a research paper. "Under a fiscal ledge scenario, even if the economy avoided outright recession, stocks would be negatively affected by a combination of very weak economic growth and higher taxes on dividends and capital gains."

Here's a map to help understand this precarious place, whether a cliff or a ledge:

The term "fiscal cliff" has become shorthand for a group of budget (aka fiscal) policy changes that will be coming together around Jan. 1. That's when the Bush-era tax cuts expire, automatic spending cuts of $109 billion kick in, the alternative minimum tax starts hitting more middle-class families, and other measures also take effect.

Congress keeps putting off the decisions that involve everything from the Pentagon budget to the expiring payroll tax holiday to cuts in Medicare payments.

**Economists are unanimous** in saying that unless the looming changes are stopped, softened or at least phased in, **the U.S. economy could plunge** — as if **falling off an economic cliff**.

## solyndra

#### Zero risk of the pounder—last Thursday was the final day Congress was in session

Ramsey Cox, The Hill, 9/17/12, Senate runs out of workdays before election recess, thehill.com/blogs/floor-action/senate/249865-senate-runs-out-of-workdays-before-election-recess

The Senate entered a brief pro forma session Monday afternoon, but didn’t conduct any legislative business out of respect for the Jewish holiday Rosh Hashanah.

The Senate will be out entirely Tuesday, leaving Wednesday and Thursday as likely **the only two days left before the election recess**.

Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid (D-Nev.) hasn’t formally announced a schedule, but the House has decided to adjourn at the end of this week so that members can campaign for the Nov. 6 election.

The Senate is planning to try and pass a veterans’ jobs bill, S. 3457, and the six-month spending resolution, H.J.Res. 117, before members leave.

#### No time for another vote

John McKinnon, WSJ, 9/13/12, blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2012/09/13/senate-dems-tee-up-tax-bill-but-quick-work-isnt-likely/

**Never bet against congressional inertia**, however. The congressional calendar appears to leave little room for an extenders vote before the Senate goes home to campaign. And a more-pressing priority remains a continuing resolution to fund the government on a short-term basis.

#### Solyndra controversy is the a reason the plan is unpopular

Harder, 11

(Energy Reporter-National Journal, “What Role Should Government Play in Energy Production?,” http://energy.nationaljournal.com/2011/09/what-role-should-government-pl.php#170907)

How should the Obama administration and Congress promote different sources of energy ranging from renewables to fossil fuels?

The failure of solar manufacturer **Solyndra has triggered a debate in Washington over what role the federal government should play in promoting** innovative--but risky--renewable energies. The company's downfall has **triggered scrutiny of a host of** other types of **government incentives**, including **nuclear-power loan guarantees, tax credits to renewable energy** companies**, and tax breaks to oil firms**.

But GOP complaining about Solyndra hasn’t attracted attention because there’s no bill

Flock, 9-11

Elizabeth Flock, staff writer for U.S. News & World Report, US News World Report, http://www.usnews.com/news/blogs/washington-whispers/2012/09/11/google-data-voters-may-not-care-about-solyndra

Searches for the company's name were so low that they did not even show up on a graph when compared to other subjects used to criticize Obama, including "obamacare," "obama muslim," "obama jobs" and "obama birth certificate."

Interest in Solyndra proved low both over the four year period of Obama's presidential term, as well as over the last twelve months, Google Insights for Search shows.

The low level of interest doesn't match up to the doggedness with which Republicans have attacked Obama on Solyndra.

In May, GOP presidential nominee Mitt Romney made a surprise visit to the shuttered Solyndra headquarters to accuse Obama of "crony capitalism," saying the solar company received federal loans because of its ties to the administration. Last month, Romney's running mate, Paul Ryan, decried Solyndra's "gold-plated connections" in his acceptance speech at the Republican National Convention.

Hundreds of news stories about the political angle of the company's closing have been published over the last 30 days alone.

Sorting the Google searches for "Solyndra" geographically, it becomes clear that interest in the failed company may be big inside the Beltway, but lagging outside of it. The tiny District of Columbia had more interest in the term over the last 12 months than any state.

## Link

#### New spending especially controversial—violates bipart spending agreement to keep the government running (link uniqueness too)

Deidre Walsh, CNN, 9/11/12, Congress has little motivation for compromise before election, lexis

After a five-week summer recess, Congress returns to a long list of unfinished business, but with 57 left days before Election Day, it's likely it will tackle only the bare minimum in its short fall session. The one must-pass measure -- a short-term continuing resolution to fund federal agencies -- will avoid any pre-election talk of a government shutdown, with which neither party wants to be tagged. Republican and Democratic leaders struck a deal this summer on a six-month bill, but both chambers still need to pass the legislation before government funding expires at the end of this month. The House is expected vote on the bill Thursday, and two GOP leadership aides predict it will get a sizable bipartisan majority. A senior Senate Democratic aide tells CNN the Senate is expected to approve the measure next week. Rep. Kevin McCarthy, the third-ranking GOP leader in the House, did not directly answer whether a majority of House Republicans would vote for the stopgap spending bill, but said, "I expect that bill to be a bipartisan vote, and I expect the Senate to pass it as well and not add anything to it." What could move -- It's possible that GOP and Democratic leaders could work out a deal on a farm bill to reform agriculture programs and provide some relief to drought-stricken states -- or at least agree to another short-term extension of the current law, according to multiple congressional aides. If they can't reconcile differences between the two varying approaches taken by the House and Senate, some money for drought assistance, plus some money for states affected by recent natural disasters, could be tacked onto the spending bill. McCarthy, who represents some agricultural interests in his California district, told reporters Monday he's still pressing to pass a bill before the election. He acknowledged to reporters on Capitol Hill that "the time frame is tough," but "it's our intent to get it done." -- The Senate will return and work on a veterans jobs bill this week. Senate Democrats are also considering action this month on a housing bill that President Barack Obama included on his congressional "to do" list earlier this summer, but House Republicans haven't expressed any desire to act on it. -- Some key provisions of the federal wiretapping bill known as FISA that was created after the 9/11 terror attacks under President George W. Bush are due to expire at the end of the year, and Congress is expected to pass an extension of the current law. House Republicans have slated a vote this week to renew the current law for another five years. Likely to be punted **The** roughly eight-week **sprint to Election Day means** several **major measures** that lawmakers have failed to make any progress on over the summer **will continue to languish on Capitol Hill**. These include some issues that both parties say they want to address but will have little motivation to compromise on: The renewal of the Violence Against Women Act, a bill providing new cybersecurity protections and legislation to reform the postal service, which recently defaulted on payments to the Treasury Department for employee health plans. In each case, the proposal favored by the GOP-led House is at odds with the bills in the Democrat-controlled Senate. A divided Congress means these issues will be punted into the lame duck session after the election, or even postponed until next year. Less legislating and more campaign messaging While there won't be much legislating, congressional aides say the messages from leaders and rank-and-file members on Capitol Hill will echo the campaign themes of Obama and GOP presidential candidate Mitt Romney, particularly when it comes to the economy and jobs. On his first post-convention stop in New Hampshire on Friday, Obama prodded voters to urge Congress to pass his jobs legislation. "If the Republicans are serious about being concerned about joblessness, we could create a million new jobs right now if Congress would pass the jobs plan that I sent to them a year ago -- jobs for teachers, jobs for construction workers, jobs for folks who have been looking for work for a long time. We can do that," Obama said. Kevin Smith, a spokesman for House Speaker John Boehner, emphasized that the House GOP has already approved legislation aimed at helping the economy. "The House has done its job. We've passed more than 30 jobs bills." Noting that House Republicans have also passed a bill to undo the automatic spending cuts scheduled to go into effect in January and extend all the current tax rates, Smith added, "We are ready to act on all of those measures if the president and Senate Democrats would show some courage to work with on those things with us." Romney continues to highlight the Obama administration's failed loan to the now-bankrupt energy company Solyndra. House Republicans will keep the issue out front with a vote this week on a bill to eliminate the federal loan guarantee program that funded several energy start-ups. Dubbed the "No more Solyndras Act," the GOP bill is expected to pass mostly along party lines, but won't move in the Senate. One open question is whether GOP vice presidential nominee Rep. Paul Ryan of Wisconsin will return to the Capitol for any part of the September session. Under Wisconsin law, Ryan is allowed to also run for his House seat, so he may feel pressure to take a break from barnstorming battleground states to vote on the bipartisan deal to keep the government funded. McCarthy told reporters Monday that Ryan would be back in Washington on Thursday to vote on the continuing resolution, and a Romney campaign official confirmed that. The six-month spending bill keeps the government funded at the level agreed to in last summer's debt deal -- $1.047 trillion. But after criticism from a bloc of conservative House Republicans that the deal didn't cut spending fast enough, Ryan introduced a budget that moved the overall spending level about $20 billion lower to $1.028 trillion. **That budget** passed the House, but **was immediately rejected** by Senate Democrats **as violating the bipartisan** debt **deal**.

#### Any energy policy without a clear link to revenue generation poisons the well

Macauley, 12

(1/6, Vice President for Research and Senior Fellow, Resources for the Future, “It’s Economics,” http://energy.nationaljournal.com/2012/01/whats-in-store-for-2012.php)

**Congressional action on energy**, climate, or both **seems unlikely** unless a clear link to the economy is perceived. **The nation’s fiscal distress calls for attention to revenue, tax reform, and spending reductions**. All of these can be addressed by a variety of actions, but worth a long look is a reasonable carbon tax. A $20 per ton tax would raise $100+ billion and could be used directly for deficit reduction or to reform the US tax code by lowering payroll and corporate income taxes, in turn accelerating economic growth and job creation. It’s also clear that the public welcomes new energy supplies but there are risks that we need to manage from unconventional energy production, whether drilling in ultradeep Gulf waters, in the Arctic, or in shale-gas and oil-sands rich regions. More study—and informed public debate—is needed. Actions by the US EPA under the Clean Air Act (CAA) to both cut carbon and push for stronger control of traditional pollutants, taken together, will influence the fate of coal power. With Congress unlikely to do anything this year – although a carbon tax really should be on the table -- the Act is the only federal tool for regulating carbon. But the EPA’s carbon regulatory program is under attack, both in the courts and by some in Congress. Analysis indicates that using the CAA will not cause the "train wreck" critics predict, and could lead to meaningful carbon cuts - though it is true that the tools in the Act are far from perfect, and using them well requires the EPA to be both smart and bold. The Act is worth protecting and using to target carbon emissions, but in the long term it will need to be supplanted by new legislation. The **political tradeoffs** **involved** in this switch **will be difficult**. The economics are also large, but **without a clearer perceived link to solving fiscal problems, it is very hard to see them happening this year.**

#### NRC deregulation spurs controversy and Congressional scrutiny

Jill Graham, States News Service, 1991, Pa., 15 other states, challenging federal nuclear waste disposal policy, Lexis

The state and 15 others filed a brief in federal court here Tuesday in support of a lawsuit that challenges a new federal Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) policy that would permit the deregulation of waste below a certain radiation level.

The lawsuit was filed in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia by 29 citizens' groups last August.

Under the NRC policy, material from nuclear plants and hospitals, such as gloves and laboratory equipment, could be dumped in landfills or sewers, incinerated or recycled into consumer products.

Pennsylvania, like at least four other states, has a law banning such unrestricted disposal of the waste. Its law, signed by Gov. Robert P. Casey last summer, requires that the potentially harmful waste be dumped only in specially-licensed low-level radioactive waste disposal facilities.

Some fear, however, that the NRC policy will override state laws. Pennsylvania shares those concerns, according to Susan Woods, spokeswoman for Pennsylvania's Department of Environmental Resources.

"We did it to preserve the validity of our statute," Woods said of the state's decision to become involved with the lawsuit.

The NRC has said it will use the policy guidelines on a case-by-case basis as requests for exemptions are submitted by the nuclear industry.

NRC officials argued in congressional hearings last year that the policy would protect public health and the environment and allow regulators to focus on controlling more significant risks to the public.

The watchdog group Public Citizen, which is heading the lawsuit, has argued that if the policy is implemented, it would significantly increase the number of fatal cancers in the United States because radiation would seep into the air, water, soil and food chain.

"(The policy) poses one of the gravest health risks ever perpetrated on the general public by a government agency," said Jonathan Becker, an energy policy analyst with Public Citizen.

"The states recognize that the NRC's . . . rule trades off people's lives in favor of the financial interests of the nuclear industry," Becker said Tuesday.

The controversial issue is expected to be the subject of congressional hearings and legislation this year.

#### No turns—every energy policy is polarizing

Christine Todd Whitman 12, CASEnergy Co-Chair, Former EPA Administrator and New Jersey Governor, “Nuclear Power Garners Bipartisan Support”, August 13, http://energy.nationaljournal.com/2012/08/finding-the-sweet-spot-biparti.php?rss=1&utm\_source=feedburner&utm\_medium=feed&utm\_campaign=Feed%3A+njgroup-energy+%28Energy+%26+Environment+Experts--Q+with+Answer+Previews%29#2237728

It’s clear from the debate around the merits and drawbacks of various electricity and fuel sources that energy policy can be a highly polarizing topic. In fact, it’s arguable that there is no energy option that holds a truly bipartisan appeal: Every form of energy faces pockets of dissent. This makes crafting universally accepted energy policy particularly challenging.

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#### Politics tests a key opportunity cost

Saideman, associate professor of political science - McGill University, 7/25/’11

(Steve, “Key Constraint on Policy Relevance,” http://duckofminerva.blogspot.com/2011/07/key-constraint-on-policy-relevance.html)

Dan Drezner has a great post today about how the foreign policy smart set (his phrase) gets so frustrated by domestic politics that they tend to recommend domestic political changes that are never going to happen.

I would go one step further and suggest that one of the key problems for scholars who want to be relevant for policy debates is that we tend to make recommendations that are "incentive incompatible." I love that phrase. What is best for policy may not be what is best for politics, and so we may think we have a good idea about what to recommend but get frustrated when our ideas do not get that far.

Lots of folks talking about early warning about genocide, intervention into civil wars and the like blame "political will." That countries lack, for whatever reason, the compulsion to act. Well, that is another way of saying that domestic politics matters, but we don't want to think about it.

Dan's piece contains an implication which is often false--that IR folks have little grasp of domestic politics. Many IR folks do tend to ignore or simplify the domestic side too much, but there is plenty of scholarship on the domestic determinants of foreign policy/grand strategy/war/trade/etc. Plenty of folks look at how domestic institutions and dynamics can cause countries to engage in sub-optimal foreign policies (hence the tradeoff implied in my second book--For Kin or Country).

The challenge, then, is to figure out what would be a cool policy and how that cool policy could resonate with those who are relevant domestically. That is not easy, but it is what is necessary. To be policy relevant requires both parts--articulating a policy alternative that would improve things and some thought about how the alternative could be politically appealing.

Otherwise, we can just dream about the right policy and gnash our teeth when it never happens.